Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that large scale reforms are underway in the Armenian armed forces, guided by international experience. Armenia has introduced a 24-day military training program to build reservists with essential fighting and endurance skills. The government envisions testing this approach by drawing on a Swiss model as a benchmark.
First, it helps to recall what the Swiss model looks like. The Swiss armed forces operate on a mixed system that blends voluntary, contracted, and compulsory service to sustain personnel. The Confederation maintains two main branches: ground forces and air forces. The ground forces include three mechanized brigades along with supporting units and training formations.
Service in Switzerland is mandatory for all male citizens and typically spans around 260 days across a decade. Swiss soldiers may keep small arms and ammunition at home, though home storage of ammunition was prohibited in 2007.
Turning to the Armenian leadership, Pashinyan appears to be steering military development from a position that some observers feel may not be the most intuitive entry point for this task. Yet the reality remains that a nation’s armed forces serve as a tool of war and are oriented toward either combat or preparation for conflict. A third state of military organization does not exist in practice.
When reforming an army, the question is not simply which model of development fits best a particular country. It is about identifying the goals and tasks faced by the state as a whole and the armed forces in particular.
Initially, Pashinyan should articulate precise requirements for preparing the country and its armed forces to deter potential aggressors, specify methods and forms of warfare, and only then advance practical plans for military space construction under the leadership of the political and military command. In doing so, it is essential to weigh the nation’s economic, military, moral, and psychological capacities.
At the same time, it would be naive to assume that the cabinet lacks awareness of these realities. The key question lies elsewhere.
Balance of power
Armenia has a population under three million and a military budget around 1.5 billion dollars. That amount is insufficient to procure a fleet of modern multirole fighters such as the F-16 Block 70/72, which costs well over 150 million dollars per aircraft.
Nearby neighbors present a stark contrast: Azerbaijan with about 10 million people and a military budget of roughly 3.1 billion dollars, and Turkey with a population near 85 million and a military budget around 15.8 billion dollars. The shared narrative of one people, two states from Baku and Ankara adds pressure on Yerevan, creating a tense strategic environment.
Even if Armenia deployed its entire human and financial capacity, building a competitive modern army would remain a heavy challenge while mobilization constraints and resource limits persist. A fresh strategy is needed.
In assessing the situation, it is important to note that Armenia lost Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan achieved its objectives in September 2023 within a day, and neither Russia nor the CSTO offered meaningful assistance to Yerevan during the Second Karabakh War, an outcome that reshaped regional security calculations.
Course toward NATO alignment
The prevailing view among many Armenians is that Russia and the CSTO cannot guarantee national security, prompting questions about strategic realignment. While Karabakh’s loss remains a long memory, Armenia has signaled a reconsideration of its security architecture. The potential path ahead includes normalizing relations with neighbors, gradually reducing reliance on Moscow and CSTO, and moving toward closer ties with Western security structures. This shift is framed as a long-term recalibration rather than a quick pivot.
Contemporary Armenian leadership has not publicly announced a sweeping military campaign against neighbors. The emphasis is on reducing confrontation and pursuing pragmatic reforms that align with evolving strategic realities. The Swiss model, with its disciplined approach to arms control and reserve management, is seen as a plausible, interim blueprint should Armenia approach NATO membership in the future. The idea is that combat power could be streamlined into smaller, well-trained battalions optimized for regional defense and deterrence rather than large-scale expeditionary operations.
Without properly distributing small arms and ammunition among personnel and ensuring secure storage, the risks of loss or illicit sale rise sharply. For weapons control, body armor, helmets, and other equipment to be effective requires disciplined population-level organization along with robust training and oversight. There remains work to do before 24-day training can become a standard feature of Armenia’s armed forces, but the direction is being debated in official and public spaces alike.
The perspectives presented here are the author’s interpretation and may differ from editorial views. This analysis aims to outline possible implications and does not claim certainty about policy outcomes.