In the contract of Francisco Reynés, born in Palma in 1963, certain terms stand out for governance and executive compensation. The agreement provides for a substantial payout independent of whether he is dismissed or continues as president, while his executive duties are reduced or removed. This reflects disclosures made in the group’s corporate governance report submitted to the National Securities Market Commission, and it has been a point of discussion among investors and regulators alike.
If the chief leaves the company, the arrangement contemplates two annual payments drawn from his fixed and variable salaries, plus an additional amount equal to one point twenty-five times his fixed salary to compensate for the failure to collect variable remuneration. This package is connected to a broader context, including a pension plan that has accumulated about eight point four million euros of the thirteen point three million euros saved, taking into account that the total remuneration the executive received last year was approximately two point eight million euros, with the fixed portion amounting to around two point two million. All told, the compensation and savings discussed amount to roughly twenty-one point seven million euros, illustrating a sizable and carefully structured windfall tied to his service and future entitlements.
Should Reynés lose his administrative functions yet remain non-executive chairman, the compensation would stay the same in structure, but would be limited to annual income rather than long-term consideration. In this scenario the annual figure sits near five point six million euros. If the long-term incentive plan targets are not achieved, there is a clawback provision that could trigger an extra annuity payment only if the plan ends with the specified minimum profitability met. This mechanism highlights how performance and governance frameworks shape the overall reward and its alignment with shareholder value.