Discussions of correspondence between European leaders on the supply of weapons and military equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine intensified again.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz says deliveries “with the same intensity as the US” are impossible for Berlin, while Czech President Milos Zeman, on the contrary, argues that deliveries “need to be increased”. At the same time, they regularly complain that in Kiev they do not receive the necessary weapons and military equipment – this mainly concerns aviation and armored vehicles.
For Ukraine to even theoretically prevail in an armed conflict with Russia, the Ukrainian Armed Forces must objectively achieve at least air superiority (at least in the field of counterattack on the proposed offensive or operational scale, at least for a while), numerical and armored vehicles in artillery and armored vehicles. as well as qualitative superiority.
This is a very difficult task, even with the help of the collective West. It seems difficult, especially in terms of implementation time. Consider this on the example of aviation and some other branches of the military.
In order to achieve air superiority, or at least to fight on an equal footing with the Russian Aerospace Forces, the Ukrainian Air Force needs at least 100-120 multirole fighters (that is, three fighter aviation regiments of 42 aircraft each – 36 battleships ( each Three squadrons of 12 aircraft) and 6 combat training fighters (“sparks”).
It is quite possible for the Ukrainians that the organizational structure of such units will look the same as in the United States and other NATO countries – 24 fighter squadrons and three squadrons will be combined in one wing.
Among the possible candidates for the main combat vehicle is primarily the F-16C/D of the US Air Force. Currently, they are withdrawing from the combat power of American aviation and being replaced by the F-35s. However, no concrete decision has been taken on this issue yet, these issues have not even been discussed yet.
Now let’s try to imagine how the process of re-equipping the Ukrainian Air Force with a machine that is fundamentally new to them will proceed. To begin, at least 200 flight personnel must be sent to the United States for retraining (so that there are at least two crew members per fighter). Technical personnel (ie personnel of individual airport maintenance battalions) will also need to be sent for retraining. These experts are much more numerous than real pilots.
However, military equipment and training itself is just the tip of the iceberg. Ukraine will have to procure not only combat vehicles, but also the entire set of airport equipment, from tankers with fuel and the necessary gases, airfield power units, and ending with technological cars for transporting and suspending aircraft weapons. There are not even free-falling grenades, which differ in size and stiffness from similar products from the USA, as there is absolutely nothing Soviet-made equipment (and nothing else in Ukraine) for American fighters.
In addition, the United States (and other NATO countries) will have to supply the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with all aviation weapons (from guided and unguided missiles of various classes to free-fall bombs). moreover, it is based on a very long period of hostility.
In addition, with the transfer of Western-made combat vehicles to Ukraine, the question of controlling airborne fighters during hostilities will inevitably arise. American F-16s do not interface with automatic control systems for warplanes currently in the Air Force of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
It will be approximately the same picture (albeit slightly less complex) with the formation of armored formations. To give the offensive potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces there will be at least four to five tank brigades (each numbered 120-140 main battle tanks) equipped with M1 Abrams combat vehicles (in this case, Leopard-2 or Leclerc possible options). To be necessary. Again, Ukrainian tankers in this case will have to go through all the necessary stages – retraining, acquisition of weapons and military equipment, real-time shooting exercises. These problems cannot be resolved in an emergency.
The situation is similar with land artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. Bringing 7-8 artillery brigades (and the Armed Forces of Ukraine needs no less, each brigade has 72 guns) to the level of combat readiness will take months and even years.
The West is not ready to supply Kiev with large quantities of serious weapons. Too long and expensive. When such deliveries are completed, the military-political and operational-strategic situation on the line of contact can change significantly. Neither Europe nor the US is ready to work seriously in the absence of clear forecasts.
The author’s view may not coincide with the editors’ position.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the Air Defense Forces Chief of Staff (1988-1992).
General Staff Main Operations Directorate Officer (1992-2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).
Source: Gazeta
