Researchers at the Council on Foreign Relations: “The relationship between Russia and Iran is the biggest threat to the West”

How did the war in Ukraine change the relationship between Russia and Iran?

Nicole Grajewski [N.G.]: The war in Ukraine was in many ways the catalyst for this relationship. There was already a fundamental dimension to this in terms of common dissatisfaction with the international order, with some domestic political developments, but the war in Ukraine really accelerated this relationship. We see this in both the political and economic spheres. Partly due to their international positions, Russia and Iran have begun to cooperate more in areas of this relationship that were previously quite weak. What worries Europe and the USA is the military dimension of the relationship, which has undergone a significant transformation. Before the war in Ukraine, it was Russia that supplied Iran with weapons and ammunition. And now we see Iran supplying Russia with more advanced drones, equipment and technologies than before.

What changes have occurred in the economic field?

NG: Russia and Iran are cooperating more closely in areas such as de-dollarization and international foreign exchange trade. Moreover, there are internal developments in both Russia and Iran that appear to parallel the rise of hardline figures and individuals who are more hostile to the West.

Where is your relationship going in terms of your military relationship?

NG: Historically, Russia has been very reluctant to call this relationship a strategic partnership, partly because it doesn’t want to antagonize countries like Israel or the Gulf States, but also because it doesn’t want to be challenged in terms of mutual relations. for example with a defense package. But this is a flexible collaboration. There is much in common when it comes to their vision or desire for the broader processes of international order, but there is also a deep-seated sense of mistrust. In particular, as seen in our report, Iranian elites still do not fully trust Russia, because there are many legacies from the past and they are not really open to some of Russia’s intentions. So the relationship is flexible and will likely remain flexible. But it works that way by design: Russia and Iran can work in areas where they have common interests, but they can also avoid areas of tension and work more towards areas where they actually have synergies.

How does the Kremlin view this relationship?

NG: It is difficult to delve into Russia’s decision-making and there are many inconsistencies. There is a fear in Russia that Iran could potentially turn to the West because this would reduce its influence in Tehran. One of the areas it is most affected by is the nuclear issue. So when we examine much of the Russian elite’s thinking on the nuclear issue, it becomes clear that some divisions exist. This is quite impressive because previously there was more skepticism about the potential for militarization of the Iranian program, but this has changed since the war in Ukraine. For some of these prominent thinkers, especially the hard-liners, a nuclear Iran would be less dangerous than an Iran closer to the West. There is a mosaic of opinion in Russia regarding Iran, but this often reflects internal divisions within the country.

Should Europe and the United States be concerned about the nature of this evolving relationship?

Ellie Geranmayeh [E. G.]While many European policymakers now place Russia-Iran relations at the top of their agenda, two years ago these relations were hardly a priority issue. This deepening relationship between Russia and Iran is the biggest threat to the interests of the West. In our report, we recommend that Europeans work with the United States to stop this relationship and understand that they cannot stop it completely, but there are ways to reduce partnerships in areas of Western strategic interest.

What are these ways?

EG: There are three main ways. The first is to reduce the transfer to Russia of the most advanced Iranian weapons, which will likely be used in Ukraine. The second thing that should really worry the West is that Iran is advancing its nuclear program with Russia’s tacit approval and, in some cases, actual encouragement. The third area is that this military partnership spreads to places like Syria and leads to a new military tension, especially with the USA.

At the moment, the use of diplomacy with Russia seems out of the question for Europeans and Americans. Are there more possibilities to talk to Iran?

EG: There is now an opportunity, given the détente gestures between Iran and the West in recent weeks [como la liberación de cinco ciudadanos de EEUU tras el desbloqueo de fondos iranís en Corea del Sur]. In the past, we viewed Russia as the weak link in this negotiation relationship between Russia and Iran. At the moment, the West is unable to make a deal with the Kremlin on Iran, but there is an openness with Tehran, as well as a discussion among top leaders within the country that could have an impact. To prevent Iran’s partnership with Russia, the West may expect economic compensation from Iran in exchange for security measures. The West can offer more concrete, immediate economic relief than what its eastern partners like China and Russia can offer. These relations fall short in key areas of economic trade that Iran is currently pursuing after years of crippling sanctions.

However, with these efforts, the debate on human rights in Iran is reigniting.

EG: Yes, this approach on the diplomatic front carries several risks, including a human rights component. All of this is happening at a time when the Iranian authority is being incredibly repressive on the home front; But we believe there are ways for the West to continue highlighting human rights violations, holding Iranian officials accountable, as well as encouraging support. It is a tangible event for activists on the ground, as it seeks to undermine cooperation between Russia and Iran in areas that pose a strategic threat to the security of Europe and the United States. Our article ends by introducing the idea that now is the time to impress the Russians; because the longer this situation lasts, especially the Ukraine conflict, the more likely it is that the hard-line security alliance in both countries will develop an interdependent relationship and consolidate. in all regions.