“The important events are yet to come.” How is the offensive operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine going?

According to observers, the enemy is currently trying to break through the Russian defense in Zaporozhye from three directions at once. Some military experts believe that the enemy’s plan was to make a breakthrough in the Tokmak region, and from there the Ukrainian Armed Forces planned a shot at Berdyansk, and then on Mariupol.

In general, such results are at the level of an open secret. Such intentions of the enemy have been talked about almost everywhere in the last few months.

At the same time, it is reported that Russian troops are currently repelling attacks of units and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. “In several directions, the RF Armed Forces have withdrawn to reserve positions, but it is not possible to break through Russia’s VFU defense,” said one of the sources.

It seems that this source was poorly versed in the area’s fortification equipment and had never in his life written battle reports and operational reports. In this case, he would say – “the troops retreated to a pre-prepared line of defense.” The word “positions” (“position areas”) most often refers to the firing (starting) positions of the Rocket and Artillery Forces as well as the Air Defense Forces.

The word “reserve” on the topic of fortification of the terrain appears only in the engineering works of the second stage, and in this case it sounds something like – “reserve areas and reserves for dense formations of the second echelons, reserve position areas (firing positions of the RV and A), air defense forces As the classics say, you have to be more careful.

And now we will take care of everything in order.

First, a few words about the losses of the parties. It is reported that Russian troops destroyed 33 tanks and 28 enemy infantry fighting vehicles in just one day. In addition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost 945 soldiers during the attacks. More or less? And should such losses of personnel and weapons be considered heavy/catastrophic?

For reference, the average daily losses (irreparable and sanitary) of the Red Army in strategic operations during the Great Patriotic War sometimes exceeded 20 thousand people.

The loss of weapons and military equipment during the Second World War was huge. For example, in the defensive operation in Western Ukraine (June 22 – July 6, 1941), the average daily losses of tanks reached 292 units, and in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3-23, 1943) 89. tanks. In the Berlin operation (April 16 – May 8, 1945), such losses amounted to 87 tanks per day.

The losses of armored vehicles were also significant in a number of local battles. For example, in the 1973 Doomsday War, Arab countries lost 1,270 tanks and 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in just 18 days of conflict. In other words, the average daily tank loss of Israeli opponents in this war exceeded 70 units, and the score rose to much more significant values ​​from time to time.

Therefore, the loss of 33 tanks (and this is nothing more than a battalion) and 28 infantry fighting vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at this stage of hostilities should not be considered catastrophic. Yes, sensitive, but by no means the ones that will lead to loss of combat capability and the termination of the operation.

But these are all details. And the answer to the main question – whether the offensive operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine really began, and whether the direction of the main offensive of the Ukrainian army was determined for a long time – does not yet exist. Currently, what is happening on the line of contact should most likely be treated as either local conflicts or distracting attacks. Meanwhile, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine refrains from making statements about the start of an offensive operation at this stage. Alexei Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, says the same thing.

And it is somehow difficult to assume that all the goals of the “counter-offensive”, which have been so announced over the past few months, were to engage in protracted fighting in the Malaya Tokmachka enclave and, as a result, to advance. up to 200 meters. If this is true, then we really overestimated the capabilities of the Ukrainian military leaders and thought very well about them before.

But most likely not. And all the main events of the offensive operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it should be considered, are still ahead.

First, the risks are too high. For example, the White House associates the success of the offensive operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces neither more nor less than the reputation of President Joe Biden. Among other things, the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could jeopardize a new tranche of military aid from the United States. That’s what Politico says.

Secondly, the failure of the counteroffensive will also call into question the capacity of Ukraine’s current military-political leadership, which could eventually lead to a general crisis in all areas of life in the country and sow disbelief in the possibility of eventual success. at least some victories of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the NMD fronts.

Therefore, most likely, the main forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not yet entered the battle, all the main events of the counterattack are still ahead, the directions of neither the main nor any other offensive of the Ukrainian army have yet been determined. It seems that the ongoing battles on the line of contact are aimed at misleading the Russian command about the real goals of the Ukrainian leadership.

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.

Author biography:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.

Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).