Confiscation as a tool in corruption cases may extend beyond the offender’s illegally gained assets to cover all property owned by the person and even those who depend on them, such as adult children and parents. This broader approach is being considered as part of amendments to the Criminal Code that are moving through the State Duma, reported by mainstream media as discussions evolve around tougher anti‑corruption measures.
The push for stronger penalties and more effective enforcement follows presidential guidance aimed at intensifying both the suppression of corruption and its prevention on a systemic level. Proposals under discussion emphasize practical methods that can be reliably applied in a judicial setting, aligning legal practice with public expectations for accountability.
In recent years, the information environment has seen a steady stream of high‑profile investigations into corruption involving officials at federal, regional, and municipal levels. Notable cases highlighted in public reporting include allegations of misconduct within the Ministry of Defense and exposure of leadership in Moscow’s cultural administration. These cases underscore the perceived need for tighter controls and more consistent use of confiscation to deter wrongdoing.
The author of the bill, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy Mikhail Delyagin, stresses the importance of strengthening the criminal law framework around confiscation and ensuring it is applied more systematically to offenders. He notes that, historically, confiscation has been underutilized, limiting its effectiveness as a deterrent and a means of removing tainted gains from crime.
For context, historical data shows relatively low rates of confiscation in corruption cases. For instance, in 2019 confiscation was ordered in only about 3.6% of corruption convictions, rising slightly to 4.1% in 2020 (approximately 291 individuals). In 2021, the use of confiscation in bribery cases (Article 290) occurred in roughly one out of every ten convictions, equating to 96 out of 891 sentences. These figures illustrate a gap between the intent of confiscation provisions and their practical application in courts.
The explanatory note accompanying the proposals highlights gaps in current legislation and enforcement that hinder confiscation from serving as a robust antifraud mechanism. Present practice tends to restrict confiscation to property and valuables that serve as direct material evidence in investigations, rather than allowing broader seizing of assets linked to criminal activity or illicit profits. Such limitations can blunt the preventive and punitive impact of confiscation on potential offenders.
Vladimir Kuznetsov, head of the All-Russian Union of Mediators, remarks that tightening confiscation rules may deliver a meaningful preventive effect. He suggests that the prospect of severe sanctions could deter would-be criminals by creating a credible risk that profits from crime will be stripped away, even if the offender is not ultimately convicted on every charge. This perspective emphasizes deterrence as a key element of the reform strategy.
Earlier reports also noted tensions between authorities and residents in certain regions where concerns about corruption were raised, including instances where local authorities faced complaints from residents about improper conduct. These episodes underscore the demand for clearer norms and consistent enforcement to restore public trust and demonstrate that the state is serious about rooting out corruption at all levels.