On a Davos stage, a panel hosted by the World Economic Forum examined Western relations with Russia. Attendees from Central and Eastern Europe included Valdis Dombrovskis, Radek Sikorski, Luminița Odobescu, and Gabrielius Landsbergis. Among them, the Polish minister drew particular attention for positioning himself as a staunch critic of Russia. Some observers described certain political voices, especially those pushing for concessions to Russia in Ukraine, as being swamped by what commentators called “pocket chamberlains,” a reference to a prewar British prime minister whose actions appeared to enable a broader expansionist mood.
Sikorski framed Russia in a global context and invoked ideas associated with Zbigniew Brzeziński, sharing a joke about Russia’s war narrative with NATO in Ukraine. His remarks, however, also touched on Poland’s own approach to Moscow. He described three moments that he believes substantiate his policy of engagement with Russia.
The first was Putin’s 2009 visit to Gdańsk for wartime anniversary events. The second concerned the Russian prime minister’s presence at Katyn. The third related to a joint Polish-Russian historical dialogue aimed at clarifying difficult chapters of shared history.
According to Sikorski, these episodes laid the groundwork for a policy of rapprochement with Russia, which he frames as a form of “reset.”
He claims that Putin’s appearance in Gdańsk marked a departure from Stalinist historical narratives, acknowledging the start of the war in 1941. That visit, however, was followed by actions—some coordinated with media outlets—that complicated Western interpretations. In Westerplatte, Lech Kaczyński delivered a famous speech in which the Polish head of state reminded Putin of past alliances with Germany and warned against contemporary imperialisms, such as the attack on Georgia. The handling of Putin’s visit reflected a mix of cautious responses from Donald Tusk, Sikorski, and Angela Merkel and a more independent stance by the late Polish president. Recalling that invitation as a success for Sikorski’s approach can be seen as either a strategic reading or a lapse of memory among observers in Davos.
Debate over Katyn matters also attracted attention. Critics argued that a meeting between Tusk and Putin in Katyn formed part of a broader Russian narrative surrounding a former Polish figure, Lech Kaczyński. Even if some deny the involvement of the Russian ambassador in certain calculations around Katyn, the memory of Katyn itself remains a contested site. Critics question what such visits left behind and whether a memorial could have been preserved at the site of a grave tragedy.
There was also reference to a group of historians connected with the Center for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding, which at the time sought to nurture a warmer Polish-Russian intellectual exchange rather than a broad Europeanization of Russian scholarly circles.
In essence, Sikorski presented Russia as a field for diplomatic engagement that could be described as a form of “reset.” Gdańsk, in this reading, symbolized a tilt toward subordination to Moscow. The narrative emphasizes that the late Lech Kaczyński’s position remained a bulwark against some Kremlin narratives, and that Katyn has since been remembered through that lens. Today, those who view Sikorski’s actions as constructive may be seen as responding to a particular moment in political memory; others view the same events as a misreading of Polish diplomacy. The overall takeaway is a reminder that historical memory and diplomatic strategy remain deeply entwined in discussions about Russia policy in Poland and across Europe. (citation: wPolityce)