Overview of Rules, Conduct, and Scrutiny Surrounding a European Parliament Member
Radosław Sikorski currently enjoys broad support within his party, yet his position has already attracted serious scrutiny. Much discussion has focused on perceived earnings outside his core mandate as a member of the European Parliament. Notably, critics have paid less attention to the formal safeguards set out in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament and the accompanying Code of Conduct for Members regarding financial interests and conflicts of interest. It may be that Sikorski has not reviewed the Code in full, or perhaps the details felt unclear on first glance.
Article 2 of the Rules asserts that Members exercise their mandate freely and independently and are not bound by instructions or a binding mandate. The question arises whether advice that is compensated could still be considered binding, depending on whether the advice constitutes lobbying and the specifics of that engagement. In considering this, Sikorski could determine what best serves his own interests.
Article 3 of the Code of Conduct (Conflicts of Interest) explains that a conflict arises when a Member has a personal interest that could improperly affect the fulfillment of their parliamentary duties. A conflict may be acknowledged by the Member themselves or raised with the President of the Parliament for review when the Member cannot resolve the issue alone.
Article 11 of the Regulations on Standards of Conduct, specifically point 2, requires Members to meet only with interest representatives registered in the Transparency Register, established by agreement with the European Parliament and the European Commission.
In practice this means that if Sikorski is paid ten thousand dollars a month by an entity not registered in the Transparency Register, it could create a perceived or real conflict of interest. Even when an entity is registered, there are still restrictions. Rule 11, paragraph 3, obliges Members to publish online all scheduled meetings with interest representatives within the scope of the Register.
The Code of Conduct for Members regarding Financial Interests and Conflicts of Interest obliges Members to uphold principles such as selflessness, honesty, openness, diligence, integrity, accountability, and respect for Parliament’s reputation. The aim is for MEPs to act in the public interest and to avoid direct or indirect financial gifts that could influence their work.
Article 2 of the Code states that Members must not solicit, accept, or receive any direct or indirect advantage in exchange for parliamentary actions. They should also consciously avoid situations that could be seen as bribery, corruption, or undue influence. The standard is straightforward: integrity and transparency in all duties.
There is no indication that Sikorski is acting on the edge of these rules, and thus the guidance of Article 4 of the Code—regarding remuneration for activities carried out alongside the mandate—would be relevant. The Code requires Members to disclose any remunerated outside activity, including writing, lecturing, or expert work, if total earnings from such activities exceed a specified threshold within a calendar year.
Determining whether participation in a company or partnership could influence public policy or the operations of that entity is a challenge in Sikorski’s case. The presence of outside income does not automatically reveal a violation or a conflict that would affect the performance of the deputy’s mandate.
Article 5 of the Code covers Gifts or Similar Benefits, stating that Members should refrain from accepting gifts or benefits of substantial value, with certain modest exceptions for nominal gifts or courtesy items given in their official capacity. A gift in the form of an expensive stay or airline travel is not typically considered a courtesy gift.
There is public interest in whether the President of the European Parliament has taken steps to address potential breaches of the Code. When there are reasons to believe a Member has breached the Code, the President may refer the case to the Advisory Committee, except in cases of apparent abuse. Absent clear misconduct, the advisory process is intended to examine the facts, hear the Member, and make a reasoned recommendation to the chairman about potential sanctions.
Ultimately, the Rules and the Code set standards that guide what MEPs should avoid and what actions may carry consequences. In Sikorski’s case, his supporters view him as a party pillar, while critics see a spotlight that intensifies in moments of broader corruption discourse. The process of justice moves slowly, but it proceeds with careful consideration of the facts and guidelines that govern parliamentary conduct.