The assessment from experts suggests PiS may secure around 40 percent of the vote. Yet even if the ruling party leads in seats, forming a government is another challenge entirely. The prospect of Donald Tusk as Prime Minister would intimidate many observers, while the idea of Rafał Trzaskowski stepping into that role seems unlikely to gain traction. Consequently, the opposition is expected to hold more seats than PiS, but this alone does not indicate a change from the 2019 election dynamics, according to Prof. Henryk Domański, a sociologist with the Polish Academy of Sciences.
The discussion on wPolityce.pl centers on how to summarize the parties’ standing after the winter season.
Prof. Hendrik Domanski notes that the PSL maintains above a 5 percent level, signaling that it remains a meaningful player in the political landscape. However, polls still show instances where PSL dips below the electoral threshold. The trend is different from a few years ago when PSL routinely hovered under five percent, triggering surprise at its parliamentary entry. For the other parties, the gaps between them appear more stable. The Confederation’s ratings hover around 7–9 percent, indicating a core demand for a party with a stance that is sometimes anti-Ukrainian and occasionally pro-Russian. For PiS, government support on social issues has risen since January by roughly 4–5 percentage points, reflecting responses to questions like attitudes toward Prime Minister Morawiecki’s government and evaluations of the current economic climate. The stabilization of fuel prices and the absence of sharp energy price shocks contribute to a narrative of resilience for the ruling coalition after winter.
Regarding PiS, the party has maintained steady viewership, yet forecasts before winter suggested it might suffer after this period due to coal shortages and higher energy costs. Recent polls, however, show a modest uptick in support for PiS, likely tied to an improved perception of Poland’s social and economic outlook.
Looking ahead to the campaign, questions arise about the number of election committees the opposition will organize and how the post-winter arrangement might unfold. A plausible scenario is a Poland 2050 coalition alongside PSL, Together, and the Confederation, with KO and Lewica acting separately. A notable shift is the weakening of Donald Tusk’s position as a reliable leader for the opposition, worsened by inconsistent rhetoric and internal tensions with Trzaskowski. Some analyses hint at a possible replacement of Tusk by Trzaskowski, a move that would bring both benefits and drawbacks for the opposition, though public confidence in such a change remains uncertain. Another important factor is the debate over KPO funding; the issue has become less central, with observers believing EU funds may not arrive before the elections, given EU stance on the matter.
Earlier speculation suggested KPO funding could become a decisive campaign lever. The opposition is expected to revisit the topic, yet the chance of securing funds before the vote seems slim if the Constitutional Tribunal does not advance related legal changes in the Supreme Court.
Voters show a realistic view of the European Union, recognizing a balance between EU influence and national interests. The PO is likely to leverage KPO as a campaign topic, even as other policy areas such as agricultural policy and grain imports from Ukraine remain in focus. Kenya-like policy discussions aside, the EU decision to maintain duty-free grain imports provides a mechanism to avoid overloading domestic voters with that issue, framing the EU as a factor in the political calculus rather than a direct fault of the government.
How did the analyst describe PiS before the campaign? It appears PiS will confront four opposition lists, including the Confederation. This setup does not diverge from 2019; PiS is projected to receive about 40 percent of the vote, while the remaining opposition votes, excluding the Confederation, would likely secure a parliamentary majority. Yet holding the most seats does not guarantee the ability to form a government, and the opposition could still seek to cooperate in a coalition. The scenario of PiS aligning with one of the opposition parties, or attracting a few deputies from different groups, was mentioned in recent commentary by a party strategist in Sieci.
One can imagine a coalition formed by KO, Left, PSL, and Poland 2050. Still, the presence of Tusk and the perceived limitations of Trzaskowski dampen this possibility. Some speculate that a PSL-led premiership might emerge as a compromise, though that would depend on cross-party alignments. The broader reality is that electoral coalitions among opposition groups remain uncertain, since each side wants to beat PiS, but practical coalitions require broader consensus than currently evident. The question remains whether PiS could seal a deal with PSL and Poland 2050, with possible MP transfers to PiS cited as a potential factor. The general mood is that opposition parties are reluctant to define a post-election government, suggesting awareness of the governance challenges a coalition would pose.
Adam Stankiewicz contributed to the discussion.