In April 2023, the head of the Polish Catholic Church in Poland, Professor Wiktor Wysoczański, died. This small denomination, now numbering under 20,000 followers who reject papal supremacy, once carried a political design by the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic.
The church’s roots reach into the Polish-American community of the late 19th century, which opposed certain bishops whose leadership merged parishes and local customs in ways that clashed with patriotic sentiment and sparked rebellion among some peers. By 1918, believers belonging to this community began establishing modest structures in a reborn Poland. Despite the strength of the Roman Catholic Church, the group remained largely on the cultural fringe, playfully blending Polish Christian traditions with a nationwide tendency toward self-confidence.
The Communists Take Over the Polish Catholic Church
In the postwar era, the path of this movement shifted. After dismantling the old leadership and the imprisonment and assassination of the community’s leader, Bishop Józef Podlewski, by the UB, the Polish Catholic Church fell under the Bureau of Religious Affairs, the fifth department of the Ministry of Public Security. While Podlewski had once stood as a symbol of resistance against oppression, his successors gradually aligned with the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland. Some clergy continued to identify with Roman Catholicism, but policy breaks and customary suspensions created friction with bishops.
The security services sought to weaponize the structure against the Roman Church. From 1951 onward, discussions about a distinct “Polish Catholics” movement gained traction as the state sought to reorganize religious life. By 1953 the Primate Wyszyński was detained, intensifying efforts to bolster non-Catholic Christian groups while suppressing the Roman Catholic clergy on a broad scale.
As a concrete example, the regime redirected resources toward the evangelical communities that resisted communist controls, provided them with temple buildings, and offered financial support. In 1954, these and other non-Roman denominations were permitted to establish the Christian Theological Academy in Warsaw.
Attempts to Undermine the Roman Catholic Church
The approach aimed to reduce the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and foster competition. Some parallels were drawn with strategies seen elsewhere, such as supporting minority Orthodox factions to challenge mainstream Orthodoxy. Old Believers’ churches benefited from renovations, material support, and alignment with the state security apparatus.
Today, the Polish Catholic Church does not function as a hidden state antagonist against other denominations nor as a church fully endorsed by authorities. There is no reason to believe that its ministry is driven by malice or material gain that once motivated certain factions—those were outcomes tied to the pre-1989 era.
The style of manipulating religious life by state institutions was a classic tactic used to weaken a larger adversary, even if it did not succeed in eroding the power of the Roman Church in Poland.
The Polish-Catholic structure served more as a channel to divert clergy who clashed with hierarchs, rather than as a sustained tool against the broader society. The security services fostered misunderstandings between parishes and bishops, and then leveraged the appearance of congregations aligned with the Bureau of Religious Affairs as a form of schism. Under the leadership of the era’s regime, many religious communities faced pressure and coercion, limiting their ability to resist.
“Beware of Cops”
The tactic of creating an alternative community to weaken the main one is a long-standing ploy used by occupying powers. In the 19th century, efforts to organize citizens for national purposes produced centers like the Nobility Institute and patriotic priestly initiatives that aimed to steer religious life toward political ends.
Similar dynamics persist in contemporary circles in Poland, where some conservative groups receive attention from liberal media, and clergy or publicists with Catholic titles appear in mainstream outlets. These appearances can influence voters or readers, especially during elections, by reframing Catholic public presence in broader political discourse.
In political contests, especially in Senate races, one might see candidates identified as right-leaning yet with slim chances of victory but with the potential to swing demographic support away from liberal or left-leaning opponents. The same pattern can occur when Catholic commentators or priests appear in the media and are presented as representatives of Catholic thought, or even as professors who claim priestly authority.
Within this context, secret political plays often surface on the right flank of Poland’s political spectrum. Notably, public figures once seen as hardline patriots can evolve into symbols of liberal or anti-PiS coalitions.
In such settings, many well-meaning individuals may be misled by lofty slogans, and their backing for causes can be uncertain.