Putin’s Likely Risk Aversion Shapes Russia’s War Strategy
Recent assessments from the American Institute for War Studies, ISW, point to a pattern where Vladimir Putin avoids bold moves that could threaten his grip on power or trigger a wider international confrontation over the Ukraine conflict. This framing suggests Moscow has prioritized controlled steps over large, reckless gambits.
Fear of risk
The Kremlin leadership appears to pursue military goals that are ambitious and at times unrealistic, notably the aim to bring all of Ukraine under Moscow’s influence. Analysts contend that achieving such aims would require risks Moscow has shown reluctance to take, raising questions about how quickly this war can reach a decisive end. ISW notes a persistent disconnect between stated aims and the practical appetite for the degree of risk that would be necessary to realize them.
The assessment argues that Putin’s hesitance to embrace conventional war risks makes nuclear escalation or a broader clash with NATO unlikely in the near term. From the start, the invasion plan favored rapid, decisive action while mobilization and social costs were kept in check. The outcome has been a drawn-out, costly conflict rather than a quick victory, prompting Russia to rethink both military and political tactics.
Putin’s misconceptions
Analysts propose that in February 2022 Putin may have acted on the belief that the Russian military could compel Kyiv to surrender with relatively limited losses. The invasion was treated as a constrained risk operation rather than a full-scale war. ISW points to data suggesting Kremlin planners expected a swift Ukrainian defeat and surrender, while warnings from the Central Bank about the costs of Western sanctions were reportedly overlooked, fueling overconfidence in a rapid victory.
The defense of Kyiv and broader Ukrainian resistance exposed flaws in Moscow’s war plan and pushed Putin toward difficult, costly choices in a prolonged conventional conflict. Still, ISW notes that several pragmatic actions—if taken earlier—were delayed or only partially implemented. Measures such as delaying mobilization, declaring partial mobilization to keep much of the population disengaged from combat, and pursuing a so called special military operation instead of a formal declaration of war or martial law are among those contested steps.
Take care of your own image
Even after battlefield setbacks in late 2022, internal assessments indicate Putin often chose lower risk options driven in part by concerns about domestic perception of war costs. Analysts highlight reforms within Russia’s military and defense industrial complex that were slowed or rolled back as a consequence. There is a sense that Putin is reluctant to announce a second major mobilization and has favored quiet or silent mobilization to avoid broad public discontent, according to Western officials and contemporary analyses.
Additionally, the president has steered clear of actions that would directly tie him to responsibility for the war, instead placing blame on others such as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu or senior military commanders when criticism arises. ISW reiterates early assessments that Russian threats of a conventional war with NATO do not align with Moscow’s actual capabilities and that nuclear rhetoric tends to be used as a bargaining tool meant to intimidate Western governments.
In related reflections, analysts note that Putin may have overestimated some military capabilities, with the occupation of Donbass by March appearing not to meet the timing his initial timetable would have required. Questions persist about whether fear, miscalculation, or a combination of both shaped the Kremlin’s approach to the war and its public messaging as the conflict continues to unfold. As events develop, observers emphasize that Moscow’s approach has often weighed strategic aims against domestic risk, political optics, and the broader goal of limiting social and economic disruption at home.