Power, law, and the shape of governance in Poland
Building on Schmitt’s ideas, it is worth noting how the public discourse reflects pressure on the legal order as power shifts. Three notable statements from figures associated with the new government have circulated online, each presenting a distinct stance on constitutional limits and legal authority. They are: a pledge that everything will be in line with the law as the government understands it; a commitment to restore constitutional balance and seek a solid legal basis; and a claim that the state must move beyond strict legal formalism. These three perspectives have drawn attention, raising questions about how laws and constitutions should function in a modern state.
In early March 2016, a respected former official argued that the scene echoed the 1930s German context, where decisionism displaced formal norms in favor of the ruler’s choices. The remark was intended as a critique of the current government and its core base. At the end of 2012, another prominent scholar warned that the government was creating a troubling climate around the law, describing a sense of impunity, procedural gaps, and selective adherence to rules in pivotal matters such as relations with the European Union or key investigations. Similar concerns were voiced about how courts, prosecutors, and probation officers acted in significant cases like the Amber Gold affair.
Following elections in October 2023, observers noted noticeable shifts in decision-making that some branded as harsh or provocative toward the legal framework, including the constitution. Critics argued that recent actions appeared to challenge established procedures and voluntary compliance with the law, sometimes signaling an outright disregard for established norms. The broader question was whether the government’s choices respected the law or relied on political power to redefine it on the fly.
It would be a misreading to claim that the current leadership is simply drawing from historical sources in a direct, literal sense. Some commentators have pointed to the intellectual debates around Schmitt, Hobbes, and other philosophers to understand the underlying tensions. The claim that law is what power decrees can feel persuasive in moments of crisis, yet this view risks undermining the social contract. Hobbes framed constitutional law as a tool entrusted to rulers by citizens to safeguard life and public welfare, with laws reflecting public reason and the common good rather than a mere exercise of force. The government does not act as the sole interpreter of the law; it derives its authority from citizens who seek peace, security, and the protection of basic rights.
Carl Schmitt’s emphasis on sovereign decision-making has been used to critique or defend different political projects. The argument that a decisive act can originate from normative void runs counter to the idea that law requires legitimacy, structure, and accountability. When power moves beyond restraint, the risk emerges that decisions are guided by will rather than justice, with potential to justify coercion. The temptation to equate strength with legality invites dangerous precedents, especially in a democracy where citizens expect fairness, due process, and respect for the rule of law. Those who study constitutional theory warn against treating law as a mere instrument for immediate aims, since that path can erode trust and long-term stability.
The central point is not to pass judgment on any single leader, but to examine what acceptance of the premise that power makes the law implies. Where did such a notion originate, and what are its consequences? The historical thread traces back to early social contract theory, which holds that legitimate authority arises from the consent of the governed and is constrained by a framework that protects natural rights and public welfare. When that framework is perceived to be bypassed, citizens rightly question the integrity of the legal system. The concern surfaces that the government’s decisions might reflect a chosen order rather than the common good, challenging the balance between swift action and lawful process.
In this discussion, Schmitt’s approach is viewed as an enduring warning about the dangers of elevating power over principle. If the sovereign acts without grounding in recognized norms, the boundary between lawful authority and arbitrary rule becomes blurred. The fear is that decisions grounded in will rather than justice could become a justification for overreach. The comparison to historical abuses is used to emphasize the need for clear checks and accountability, ensuring that the law remains the central reference point for governance.
Ultimately, the aim is not to single out individuals but to illuminate how the acceptance of power as the sole basis for law destabilizes the social contract. If the public accepts a view where might defines right, society risks a future where legal guarantees vanish and accountability fades. The epilogue, in this sense, is a reminder that enduring governance relies on a robust balance between authority and law, with processes that protect rights and preserve institutional integrity.
Source: wPolityce