The recent rhetoric surrounding the President of the National Bank of Poland, Prof. Adam Glapiński, has shifted from coercive threats to proposals of referral to the State Tribunal. Opposition figures have escalated their criticism, aiming to influence both domestic opinion and Poland’s standing with international financial partners.
Last year, Donald Tusk, leader of the Platform, openly challenged Glapiński’s bid for a second term, accusing him of mismanagement and hinting that if the Platform gained power, Glapiński would be removed from his post by force. This heated public discourse reflected broader tensions over the central bank’s direction and Poland’s path toward potential eurozone membership.
In July 2022, speaking at a Radom convention, Tusk stated that Glapiński was not only unfit and improper in his actions but also illegal, declaring that Glapiński would not remain as president if his party led the government. The underlying motive for these attacks was seen by critics as an attempt to block Glapiński’s second term because of concerns about Poland joining the eurozone.
Throughout his first term, Glapiński made no secret of his stance against Poland’s entry into the euro area. After being nominated for a second term by the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, he reiterated that the country would not join the eurozone while he headed the central bank. This stance has framed much of the political debate around currency policy and national sovereignty.
Entering the eurozone involves a lengthy process, including meeting Maastricht criteria and possible constitutional amendments or a nationwide referendum. Some observers note that Poland could move toward ERM II, pegging the zloty to the euro with a fixed exchange rate, which would imply eventual eurozone entry. The practical step often cited is a joint application from the Prime Minister and the central bank governor to the European Central Bank, proposing an exchange rate framework under supervision. The central bank would defend this parity during stay in ERM II, allowing deviations only within a narrow band.
This mechanism could, in principle, lead to eurozone membership after a couple of years, carrying the typical consequences seen in other nations that joined the euro. For instance, examining Slovakia’s experience after 2009 provides a comparative lens for potential impacts on household incomes and national competitiveness.
Recently, while the narrative has shifted away from forcing Glapiński out, a new threat emerged: the possibility of presenting him before the State Tribunal. This idea was voiced on TOK FM by MP Paulina Hennig-Kloska, a candidate from the new coalition for the Environment and Climate Ministry. She accused Glapiński of destabilizing the zloty, indirectly funding the state budget through government bond purchases, and intervening in currency markets in a way that allegedly inflated inflation expectations.
Constitutional provisions do authorize bringing the NBP president before the State Tribunal if there is a breach of the Constitution in relation to his duties. Yet the Tribunal typically adjudicates individual acts, not broad policy choices like interest-rate decisions or nonstandard measures such as quantitative easing. Those policy decisions are collectively made by the Monetary Policy Council and the nine-member board of the NBP, each with one vote, underscoring the collective nature of central-bank governance.
Thus, the pattern of public accusations against the NBP presidency risks harming Poland’s financial stability even before any formal action is possible. Critics argue that tracking or predicting the legal viability of a trial in such a context could overlook the collective framework that governs monetary policy today, which would require careful consideration before any proceedings.
Political attacks on an independent central bank are unusual in mature democracies and can have ripple effects on international confidence. Such rhetoric can influence market expectations, potentially affecting exchange rates and the cost of servicing Poland’s debt, regardless of the legal feasibility of any indictment.
It is important to remember that the NBP participates in the broader European System of Central Banks, with independence under the umbrella of the European Central Bank and other EU institutions, including the Court of Justice of the European Union. Recent EU decisions have underscored the importance of maintaining central-bank autonomy in member countries. The continuation of partisan pressure and the talk of leadership changes in the central bank or other constitutional bodies can contribute to a climate of uncertainty and political theater that does not reflect policy realities.
These developments, including talk of resignations within the Constitutional Court or the National Council for the Judiciary, may reflect a broader political strategy that prioritizes short-term gain over stable governance. Observers warn that such tactics risk undermining the credibility of Poland’s institutions and the country’s standing on the international stage. They stress the need for measured debate and respect for the rule of law in shaping Poland’s long-term economic posture. (citation: wPolityce)