At a conference focusing on the Polish-Ukrainian collaboration to secure energy for the future, Prime Minister Morawiecki highlighted actions taken by the PO-PSL government and by Tusk himself that increased Poland’s reliance on Russian energy, especially oil and natural gas.
The government’s most notable move, he argued, was the decision in the fall of 2010 to extend the gas contract with Russia to 2037. Strong protests from the then opposing party, Law and Justice, combined with intervention from European Commission officials, eventually led to a final agreement extending the contract only through 2022.
Morawiecki drew a stark image, comparing the former prime minister to a horse in a mine who, during his tenure, consistently steered Poland toward greater energy dependence on Vladimir Putin.
Close ties with Russia under the Tusk administration
Two weeks prior, at a press briefing, Daniel Obajtek, head of the Orlen group, stated that Poland imported oil and gas from Russia worth about 700 billion PLN during Donald Tusk’s time in office. He noted that this figure equates to more than two national budgets from the 2015 period, when the state budget expenditure stood around 330 billion PLN.
Over eight years of close cooperation with Russia, the PO-PSL government allegedly provided more than 200 billion dollars to what was described as Putin’s war apparatus, using a brutally practical approach to energy supply. The period also saw limited efforts to curb imports of oil and gas from Russia or to diversify sources, despite clear signs that Russia might use energy shipments as a political weapon.
When Law and Justice entered government, oil imports from Russia accounted for about 90 percent of domestic demand, and gas imports were entirely from Russia. Since late 2015, however, the government implemented several measures that gradually reduced reliance on Russian supplies and increased sourcing from other regions.
For example, Russian oil imports fell from 90 percent in 2015 to 68 percent in 2018, 61 percent in 2019, 40 percent in 2022, and, in light of EU sanctions and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, dropped to 10 percent in January 2023 and to zero percent by February of that year.
Orlen’s contract with Tatneft, which had continued through the end of 2024, could have continued if the European Commission approved an embargo on Russian oil via pipelines. Since no embargo occurred, the Russian side terminated the contract, halting deliveries through the Friendship pipeline, and Orlen faced the obligation to pay for undelivered shipments until the contract’s end.
The Law and Justice government spent years preparing Poland for independence from Russian gas, launching a plan to build an LNG terminal in Świnoujście that started under the late President Lech Kaczyński and reached a major milestone in 2016. The project now handles about 8.3 billion cubic meters of gas annually. The Baltic Pipe project, with a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters, plus gas interconnectors with Lithuania and Slovakia enabling 3 billion and 4 billion cubic meters respectively, and the expansion of domestic production, all contributed to the broader goal of diversification.
In the spring following Russia’s decision to demand payments for Russian gas in rubles, Poland faced the challenge squarely. The country kept gas storage above 90 percent capacity through the winter, and by late winter the storage level had fallen to about 72 percent. Even while relying on reverse gas flows from Germany, the Yamal pipeline block effectively cut Russia out of Polish gas supplies, reinforcing the shift away from dependence on Moscow’s shipments.
During seven years of the United Right’s governance, Poland was able to move away from complete dependence on Russian energy, while over the eight-year span of the PO-PSL administration, projections suggested a path toward greater diversification had stalled or regressed. Critics pointed to delays in LNG infrastructure, the Baltic Pipe project, and a controversial proposal to extend the gas contract with Russia for 25 more years, arguing these moves pushed the country toward renewed vulnerability.
Ultimately, the strategic choices of the National Unity coalition and subsequent reforms ushered in a stronger energy diversification framework, reducing exposure to Russian sources and expanding options for LNG supply, interconnections, and domestic production as pillars of Poland’s energy security strategy.