In issues 169–170 of Bimonthly Arcana, Professor Kazimierz Dadak, an economist who teaches at Western universities, examines Poland’s political landscape after a year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For years, this scholar has offered readers in Poland nonobvious financial prospects, fresh opportunities, and missed chances for the country as it seeks prosperity and a more efficient economy. This time, he voices legitimate concerns about whether the government is making prudent use of Poland’s growing role amid the current crisis. A broader debate on how Poland can strengthen its position is needed, and Dadak’s perspective adds value here. Yet there is a point of disagreement: Arcana presents a voice that in light of Russia’s current weakness argues that Putin’s empire and its military expansion do not pose a threat to Poland. Such confidence, however, invites scrutiny given the evolving security context.
The situation is far from obvious.
Here are the professor’s core arguments:
Despite modest battlefield results so far, a common refrain across the Vistula region remains that a Russian victory over Ukraine would prompt an immediate push westward. How could Russia, which could not compel a one-step victory against a country ranked a couple of positions higher than Poland in Global Firepower 2022, threaten NATO as a whole when an attack on Poland would be construed as an attack on the alliance itself?
The scholar concedes that Ukraine’s survival serves Poland’s national interests, yet he notes that a Russian approach to our borders would not alter the security picture significantly. Poland neighbors Russia in a direct way, and there is a tendency to overlook the potential risk posed by the Królewiec Enclave in any discussion of invasion threats.
In a confrontation, as the economist asserts, Poland’s victory could seem unquestionable at this juncture. For example, Arcana repeatedly cautions against overestimating Russia’s power, as weaknesses would limit resources for a fresh war.
Clausewitz is invoked to illustrate the tendency to assume rational decision making in the Kremlin. The idea, often summarized, is that war is not undertaken lightly and that the decision makes strategic choices with clear aims and methods. This contrasts with the reality on the ground, where the Kremlin’s actions often appear dictated by factors beyond pure logic.
Russia specifically
Dadak has long analyzed global economic mechanisms in Cracow’s Bimonthly, but when it comes to Russia, he sees a gap between economic data and the actual policies guiding Moscow. The question remains how Russia would press west if Ukraine cannot be defeated. Turning the economy toward wartime footing, reassessing regional security roles, rebuilding military strength, and confronting ideological hostility toward Poland could push the Kremlin to consider varied approaches. Dadak cautions against underestimating Russian decision-making, the influence of ideology, and the emotions that drive actions. The same animosity that historically influenced brutal wartime choices is still a factor in Kremlin calculations. The passage references Clausewitz to argue that rationality alone does not fully capture Kremlin behavior, and it notes the recent reality of a large-scale invasion that aimed for a rapid victory but faced a costly, protracted fight instead.
The collapse of Ukraine would be a catastrophe
The professor also challenges the notion that the Kaliningrad area presents no military problem. In fact, the Suwałki Gap between Belarus and the Baltic states is widely seen as a strategic vulnerability for NATO’s eastern flank. Analysts and former leaders have warned that defending this corridor would be crucial, given its role as a bridge to the Baltic states. The proximity of the Belarusian border to Kaliningrad amplifies these concerns, and a hypothetical collapse of Ukraine would drastically alter security calculations, potentially widening Poland’s exposure from Przemyśl to Olsztyn and through the eastern forests to the Warmian landscapes. A new security posture could demand higher defense spending, greater military readiness, and expanded border protection. The scenario of a collapsed Ukraine is presented as a shift that would place Poland at heightened alert and could set the stage for a more volatile regional dynamic.
Different types of war
The claim of an undisputed Polish victory is not universally persuasive. Ukrainians themselves envision a capable Polish military contribution, yet several factors of domestic weakness persist. Some observers worry about political fragmentation and internal disagreements that could complicate unified responses. At times, members of European and national institutions are perceived as supporting divergent policies or expressing reservations about how to approach the war. A Russian strike on Poland could take a different form from the Ukrainian conflict, possibly a localized disruption aimed at unsettling the political system from within or through hybrid tactics that complicate alliance commitments. The argument emphasizes that political dynamics, rather than sheer military might alone, would shape any such confrontation. In closing the discussion, Dadak clarifies that the concern is not to overstate Russia’s power but to recognize the strength of hatred and ideological motivation. The logic and calculations often used to gauge Kremlin strategy may not always capture the full picture of its motives.
This is a call for careful assessment rather than alarmism, a reminder to consider both strategic measures and the psychological drivers at play in the region’s security environment. A measured approach acknowledges the real threats while seeking prudent measures to bolster Poland’s resilience and alliance cohesion.
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Credit: wPolityce