For more than two years, debates within the United Right have centered on the December 2020 European Council summit and the choices made on Poland’s behalf by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. While Polish sovereignty and internal political circles may disagree on particular points, the discussions remain factual and form a core part of the coalition’s stance. A key issue in these debates is the climate package known as FitFor55.
Yesterday, on the pages of wPolityce.pl, statements by Adam Guibourgé-Czetwertyński, a Polish climate policy author and EU climate package negotiator, warranted comment and clarification.
First, he asserted that “it is not true that the Prime Minister of Poland could block anything at the European Council in 2020.” It is important to note that the European Council, under Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union, is composed of Heads of Government and “gives impetus to the development of the Union and defines overall political directions and priorities.” Its decisions are made by consensus, including the conclusions of summits, and consensus here means unanimity. In the conclusions of the European Council summit held on 10–11 December 2020, it is stated that the EU adopted a binding target to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990, and urged co-legislators to include this target in a proposal for a European climate law and to adopt it swiftly.
The outcome of this call led the European Commission to publish, a few months later, a package of amendments to various directives and regulations under the name “FitFor55.” It follows that the Prime Minister could influence the process, and indeed, the Prime Minister agreed that the FitFor55 package should be processed in line with subsequent actions by other EU bodies. It is also noted by Minister Zbigniew Ziobro that a crucial decision was taken without the participation of the Council of Ministers.
The second issue raised by Minister Guibourgé-Czetwertyński concerns the possibility of vetoing FitFor55 during the implementation phase.
First, it should be highlighted that the FitFor55 package was not processed until the European Council’s approval was obtained. After initial conclusions in December 2019, given Poland’s doubts at that time, the Commission held back legislative proposals pending directives from the European Council. The previous climate package from 2015 followed a similar pattern. If Poland had consistently vetoed EU climate targets at the European Council stage without consent, as occurred with earlier climate packages, the Commission would not have submitted new projects.
Yet the Prime Minister agreed to proceed, and the Commission presented the projects months later. The decision to use a qualified majority procedure prevented Poland from blocking these solutions within the Commission-approved process.
What is troubling in the minister’s remarks is the almost passive acknowledgment of this state of affairs. He implies that the Commission had the right to act, and when asked about a veto of FitFor55 after the European Council, the viewpoint was echoed by Konrad Szymański, the former Minister of European Affairs. This suggests that the Prime Minister accepted the possibility that Poland’s demands could be bypassed and that the entire package could be adopted against Poland’s position in the implementation phase.
The issue goes back to 2016 when the government under Beata Szydło criticized the EU climate policy, arguing that subsequent changes to climate packages circumvented treaty provisions by moving forward with majority rules. This stance echoed the effort to overturn climate packages endorsed by Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz, a concern voiced in relation to electricity and heat costs. The relevant treaty provision, Article 192, Section 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requires unanimity when changes to climate policy significantly affect a Member State’s choice of energy sources and the overall energy mix.
In 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union did not share the view of the Szydło government and rejected Poland’s complaint. Ministers Guibourgé-Czetwertyński and Szymański acknowledged this verdict and accepted the imposition of energy solutions under the fait accompli method, despite treaty guarantees of veto rights.
The FitFor55 package, effectively, restricts Poland’s ability to rely on coal, pushing the energy and heat sector toward wind, solar, and heat pumps in the short term. This shift bears significant cost implications under the ETS system and raises concerns about Poland’s energy sovereignty, as the energy supply framework could be steered by EU-wide mechanisms. In this context, Poland asserts a veto right under the Treaties, even as it contends with what it views as unlawful restrictions. It is important to remember this stance at every step and to explore both EU and national avenues to protect such rights.
Consequently, the European Council conclusions would ideally underscore the Union’s aim to change the energy mix in a way that might trigger a special legislative pathway to allow veto rights when EU acts are part of the “Fit for 55” package. Since conclusions are adopted by consensus, they do not require all parties to agree on every detail, which can leave tough, unfavorable outcomes unresolved from a national perspective.
In the referenced text, the minister characterizes doubts as politically motivated simplifications framed as concern for Polish sovereignty. Whether one agrees or not, given the consequences of FitFor55 for Poland, it seems inappropriate to frame the debate as mere political motive. The reservations have been voiced before decisions were made and were previously dismissed.
— Sebastian Kaleta
READ ALSO: Fit for 55 and veto? It is not true that the Polish Prime Minister could block anything at the European Council in 2020 [Citation: wPolityce]
Note: This summary reflects discussions published on wPolityce as part of ongoing coverage of EU climate policy and Poland’s role within it.