What happened
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un breached the spring 2018 moratorium on launching intercontinental ballistic missiles by sending a Hwansong-17 rocket toward Japan on March 24. The projectile crashed about 170 kilometers west of Aomori Prefecture’s coast, outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and caused no damage.
In response, the Japanese government convened an urgent operational briefing to gather and assess data on the alleged launch. Early data showed the missile stayed aloft for roughly 71 minutes, covered about 1,100 kilometers, and reached an altitude exceeding 6,000 kilometers.
Seoul also reacted. President Moon Jae-in confirmed the moratorium had been violated and ordered a series of ballistic and cruise missiles fired into the Sea of Japan in retaliation. Russia’s president spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, stated that Moscow was monitoring the situation and cautioned that further actions should avoid raising tensions elsewhere in the world.
How long has North Korea tested ICBMs
North Korea has conducted intercontinental ballistic missile tests that could reach the United States since 2017, beginning with Hwaseong-12, followed by Hwaseong-14 and Hwaseong-15. The peak launch year was 2017, with as many as 22 launches, after which numbers faltered amid diplomacy aimed at resolving the crisis on the Korean peninsula.
In April 2018 a moratorium on ICBM testing was announced by the DPRK.
Progress continued in 2021 with KN-27 anti-ship missiles and the Hwaseong-8 hypersonic missile, alongside tests of a long-range cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. By 2022, Pyongyang had accelerated overall missile testing, logging eleven launches in that year. Those launches followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with attempts on February 27 and March 5 and a failed launch on March 16 at an altitude around 20 kilometers near major capitals. Early launches served as demonstrations for potential reconnaissance satellite deployment, rather than simple tests.
Today’s launch is described as the first unconditional ICBM launch that clearly violated prior commitments.
Why did Pyongyang end the moratorium
Evident signals emerged on January 20 suggesting the DPRK would abandon the moratorium. The ruling Labor Party Central Committee later discussed confidence-building steps taken independently. State media highlighted heightened U.S. hostility and military threats, framing them as unacceptable prospects despite attempts at easing tensions. An expert from Seoul University commented on North Korea’s satellite ambitions and related plans announced earlier in 2021, noting the potential for a long-range missile capable of reaching the Americas. Some observers expected a launch before key regional events, but others anticipated timing around significant dates, such as national holidays or elections. The analyst also suggested Seoul’s retaliatory strikes would be symbolic given the DPRK’s lack of nuclear weapons, though overall South Korean policy had hardened in the preceding week.
China’s stance on the DPRK’s actions was discussed, with experts noting Beijing’s interest in preventing a broader arms race. While China and Russia have shown dissatisfaction with DPRK missile tests, Beijing historically limited support for weapons of mass destruction to North Korea. Observers highlighted that China’s preference is to avoid a widespread proliferation that could threaten its own regional influence. Still, there is an acknowledgment that Beijing may recalibrate depending on broader strategic calculations, including regional stability and the actions of other policymakers. Analysts also warned that North Korea’s progress could influence neighboring powers such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, potentially shaping Beijing’s future choices about restraint. The prevailing view is that China aims to minimize arms expansion while remaining cautious about direct escalation, choosing to watch and weigh options as events unfold.
Can China stop North Korea
North Korea’s next steps are expected to hinge on China’s position, since Beijing wields significant economic influence. Public assessments indicate that Beijing does not want a fully nuclear North Korea and would act if it believed escalation threatened its own interests. Yet recent dynamics show a cautious stance from China, with broader sanctions not always fully observed. Nuclear capability remains a sensitive topic, and Beijing must balance regional stability with its own strategic aims. Experts note that China will likely avoid a chorus of actions that would push Pyongyang toward greater provocation, though tactics may shift based on changing circumstances. The possibility remains that China could consider broader measures if it believes regional stability is at stake. The overarching conclusion is that Beijing does not seek a rapid spread of weapons, yet will not ignore North Korea’s advancements if it perceives direct benefits or threats to its leadership’s priorities.
The potential for North Korea to cultivate further capabilities keeps regional players alert. Various actors may reassess their positions as North Korea strengthens its missile programs, and observers caution that any shift from Beijing could unlock a broader set of responses from the international community. In the end, it is clear that China’s choices will significantly influence Pyongyang’s trajectory, with broader implications for security across Asia and beyond.