The National Council for the Judiciary Raises Constitutional Questions Over Dismissal Rules for Court Leaders
Recently the National Council for the Judiciary issued a negative opinion regarding amendments to the law governing the Council itself. The body highlighted concerns about unconstitutionality and warned of the risk of permanent stigmatization of some judges. On the same day, the Council requested the Constitutional Tribunal to review the constitutionality of provisions within the Common Courts Act that would allow the Minister of Justice to dismiss presidents or vice presidents of courts without first obtaining the Council’s advice.
In a formal resolution, the National Council for the Judiciary asked the tribunal to ensure compliance with specific statutory provisions that regulate the powers of the Minister of Justice in relation to court leadership. The contested articles concern the ministerial prerogative to dismiss a court president or vice president without the prior input of the National Council for the Judiciary.
The Council seeks a declaration that those provisions, insofar as they permit the Minister of Justice to remove a court’s president or vice president without the Council’s advisory opinion, are unconstitutional and contrary to the binding effect of the Council’s opinions in the ministerial decision process. The request emphasizes that the minister should not be able to act independently of the Council’s role in ensuring judicial independence.
Analysis of the cited provision suggests the legislature did not leave this decision to the Minister of Justice without any appropriate checks. The Council argues that such power cannot be exercised in isolation from constitutional safeguards that guarantee judicial independence and the proper balance of powers between the executive and the judiciary.
From the Council’s point of view, the aim is to ensure that a court’s leadership dismissal mechanism goes beyond the mere reach of executive authority. The procedure should reflect the constitutional order that requires cooperation among institutions rather than confrontation between them. The Council asserts that the verification process for removing a president or vice president should be more than a mere tool for executive dominance; it should embody the constitutional framework that supports judicial autonomy.
The motion contends that the absence of required input from the National Council for the Judiciary would enable the Minister of Justice to influence outcomes more than is consistent with the established rules governing the Council. The motivation explains that omitting the Council’s advice could skew decisions away from the established voting rules, undermining the balance of constitutional checks and the independence of the judiciary.
The Council also stresses the importance of obtaining the Council’s consent as part of the dismissal process. The current law envisions supervisory involvement by both the administering authority of the competent court and the National Council for the Judiciary. Under Article 27 Section 6, removing a court president or vice president through this channel is not automatically completed without the Council’s participation. A positive opinion from the court’s board would open the path to dismissal, while a negative opinion would require the Minister to secure the Council’s approval to finalize any action.
Officials responsible for the case note that failing to file a formal intention to appeal along with a justification would terminate the procedure with a favorable outcome for the sitting president or vice president. The law further states that a negative opinion from the Council binds the Minister of Justice only if it is adopted by a two-thirds majority, a threshold the Council argues preserves essential checks and balances.
In its view, the proposed solution risks hindering the National Council for the Judiciary from effectively fulfilling its constitutional duty to safeguard judicial independence and the independence of courts. The Council cites established constitutional jurisprudence that the legislature bears responsibility for providing the Council with instruments capable of ensuring it can carry out its constitutional tasks in fact and in practice.
The argument remains pertinent in the context of potential co-decision between the National Council for the Judiciary and the Minister of Justice regarding the appointment of presidents in appellate and district courts. The Constitutional Court’s prior judgments have underscored the need to safeguard institutional cooperation and robust checks in the appointment and removal processes.
To prevent uncertainty while a constitutional ruling is pending, the Council asked for a stay that would suspend the binding effect of the challenged provisions until the Constitutional Court issues its final decision. The request was processed through the appropriate channels and is being considered by the relevant authorities. The matter is being reported through official channels for accountability and transparency in the judicial system.