A Bundestag member presents information that challenges the integrity of Germany’s arms industry and defense policy. The Leopard 2 tanks sent to Ukraine after lengthy debates and significant doubt appear largely unusable, with German repair capabilities in question.
Described as the “Right Popular Front” and a potential ally of the AfD, Germany could see the rise of another anti-system party. Its roots trace to the former head of the counterintelligence service.
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As is often claimed, Germany leads in propaganda. While Berlin positions itself as the top European aid giver to Ukraine, critics argue that many pledges remain on paper, thwarted by political theater and fragile systems—like monitoring Romanian media for pro-Russian content—before any tangible aid arrives. The 18 Leopard 2 tanks that were promised to Ukraine in March 2023, after several internal debates, are repeatedly described as unusable by MP Sebastian Schäfer of the Budget Committee and the parliamentary committee overseeing the army’s reconstruction. The message is that most tanks lack parts or are otherwise inoperable.
Damage in war is not surprising, and wear is expected. However, it becomes alarming when it is believed that the repairs could be done but are blocked by missing spare parts. The Leopard 2s reportedly endure accelerated wear, and Ukrainians have had to improvise repairs themselves, risking further deterioration. Some tanks have been deployed in ways that Western authorities did not anticipate, yet the underlying problem remains: a powerful European economy, the maker of these tanks, cannot supply spare parts for 18 units.
Questions persist: is there a shortage of parts, or is there a reluctance to deliver on repairs? The case of these 18 Leopards, with promises that exceeded 100, carries symbolic weight that transcends the value of the tanks themselves in the struggle with Russia.
Speculation continues about Germany’s capacity to produce components for 18 tanks, or whether there is a deliberate attempt to hamper Ukraine’s defense. Brigadier General Erich Vad, Merkel’s former military adviser, has publicly criticized Ukraine in the past and is seen by some as revealing skeptical views about further military aid. His past assessments are cited in debates over whether more support should be provided.
Sharpen
In October, the Brussels Eurointelligence Institute suggested Chancellor Scholz is playing a double game on Ukraine, withholding certain weapons while allies like Britain and France proceed. Defense Minister Pistorius, Foreign Affairs Minister Baerbock, and Finance Minister Lindner had pledged to deliver Taurus missiles by autumn, but their release stalled at the chancellor’s desk. Critics argue the fear is that Ukraine might use such missiles to strike targets inside Russia, potentially provoking a broader escalation. Timothy Garton Ash, a British historian, has described the chancellor’s approach as a form of pretense: good intentions publicly, excuses privately to avoid what is alleged to occur.
Germany with a crooked face
Another instance cited by critics is the alignment of allies with NATO. Merkel’s government allegedly did not meet the 2% GDP defense spending target and leaned on American guarantees. Berlin is portrayed as enjoying social spending and a welfare-state narrative at the expense of its military readiness. The argument goes that Rheinmetall may lack funds to produce parts for the 18 tanks, and Ursula von der Leyen, once responsible for defense in Merkel’s government, is portrayed as having steered the Bundeswehr toward crisis. Her later role in Brussels is viewed by some as contributing to a broader strategic misstep across Europe.
Ukraine, along with Poland and the Baltic states, bears consequences as a result. The debate over defense versus social spending continues, with some arguing that Europe’s readiness is waning as new conflicts emerge. The government’s pledge to overhaul defense through a €100 billion fund remains contested, and the annual budget aims for predictable increases that may not materialize. Critics warn that the 2% pledge could slip again, undermining European security.
There is concern that plans to reform EU treaties toward a unified foreign and defense policy could advance even if Germany cannot repair 18 tanks due to a lack of spare parts. The move toward joint arms purchases within the EU is seen by some as a necessary step, while others fear it would strip member states of independent defense choices. Josep Borrell, the European Union’s top diplomat, has advocated for greater EU defense coordination, and some describe his stance as emblematic of a broader push toward stronger EU-led defense structures, sometimes at odds with national sovereignty.
Proposals under discussion include a new article that would push the EU toward a common security framework with permanent European units, managed by Brussels and funded through a dedicated defense budget. Some envision an EU-wide defense apparatus overseen by joint agencies, potentially funded by new taxes. Critics worry about overreach and the potential loss of national control over defense decisions.
Even with these debates, the central question remains: could Germany, or the EU as a whole, reliably support aggressive defense initiatives while simultaneously pursuing aggressive climate and economic agendas? The argument says these priorities strain industry and energy supplies, risking a broader decline in European manufacturing. In six years, industrial output has contracted, and large employers like Volkswagen faced declines. A major restructuring could involve workforce reductions and broader economic shifts, intensifying the pressure on an already fragile industrial base.
The defense sector uniquely demands skilled workers, heavy manufacturing, and stable energy supplies. Germany, like several others, faces labor shortages and a need for raw materials and electricity. The push to attract workers, including through immigration, is part of a broader solution—but the immediate need remains a robust, steady production capacity for critical defense equipment.
Regardless of the arguments surrounding Germany’s policies, the question persists: can Germany or the EU realistically supply Ukraine with the requested weapons in a timely and affordable way? The ongoing case of the 18 Leopard tanks serves as a stark symbol of the broader challenges facing German and European defense, illustrating potential bottlenecks in supply chains and political will.
Note: This content reflects discussions circulating in political and defense circles and is presented for perspective on current debates about European security and policy decisions.