The interview opens with a stark warning about what is described as a deliberate attempt to wage a political war within the judiciary, a move many see as potentially deadly. In this view, the environment is so hierarchical that the message is unmistakable: a career at risk if one speaks out. The interviewee, a member of the Polish political party PiS and a professor in the field, emphasizes the pressure this creates for judges who might resist perceived political meddling.
The host asks for a judgment on the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision to reduce a fine from one million to five hundred thousand euros per day for a non-existent disciplinary chamber. The response is sharp: a daily penalty of that magnitude constitutes a scandal. The origin of the penalty and the legal basis are questioned, with reference to Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union as the citation, though the interviewee questions the EU’s scope, arguing that EU law does not dictate national judicial structures.
The critique continues: the Disciplinary Chamber is described as an ordinary body that investigates alleged judicial violations. When examining the cases handled there, the majority appear related to corruption, theft, or fraud, leading to the conclusion that calling it a tool of political pressure is unfounded. The discussion then pivots to the broader issue of EU institutions asserting powers beyond what treaties grant and beyond what Polish concessions would allow.
A central point is that Article 19 emphasizes that member states must provide remedies to ensure effective legal protection in areas covered by Union law. The interviewee contends that EU law does not prescribe the organization of national courts, implying a fundamental misalignment between EU judgments and national sovereignty. The question remains whether the EU’s approach signals a push to expand powers outside the treaty framework and whether this undermines Polish governance after concessions were made to dissolve the chamber. The view presented is that the reform, while reducing the sentence, still preserves a framework that could permit impunity for certain judges and undermine the impartial application of law.
The discussion describes the reform as half measures, with no clear justification for the reduction. There is a sense that the EU decision may be a form of pressure or intimidation rather than a neutral adjustment. The interviewee suggests that the Polish government may have been offered a way to appear conciliatory while the underlying dynamics in the judiciary remain unsettled. The rhetoric moves toward a broader claim that EU actions threaten to destabilize Poland’s judicial integrity and empower a faction that would challenge the status of fellow judges. This framing casts the EU as exerting influence through procedural tweaks that affect court operations and the balance of power among judicial actors.
In this view, the judiciary becomes the front line of a political contest in which judges are expected to be insulated from personal beliefs and protected from external pressure, yet are nonetheless seen as subject to political currents. The interviewee asserts that the EU’s approach would ultimately consolidate power in Brussels while sidelining national accountability. There is a strong emphasis on the perceived political bias of the Court of Justice of the European Union, described as left-leaning, with the selection process involving a committee that evaluates candidates for the court. The claim is that committees and commissions within the EU shape outcomes by favoring certain legal philosophies, effectively screening out conservative jurists.
A proposed remedy to these concerns is a fundamental change to the treaties and a reorganization of advisory councils that enable the Court to operate with minimal external checks. The speaker argues that only by altering the treaty framework and removing certain European bodies could the system become more transparent and accountable. Until such changes occur, the CJEU is portrayed as unlikely to alter its trajectory, despite elections in member states that could bring new political dynamics to the European Parliament and national governments.
The conversation draws a parallel with the United States, noting that judicial outcomes are influenced by the ideological leanings of judges, particularly in politically charged issues such as abortion. This comparison serves to illustrate why the political composition of the court matters for the shape of public policy. The same logic is then applied to the CJEU, with the assertion that a left-liberal orientation and the internal mechanisms for approving candidates contribute to the court’s perceived predictability in its rulings. The interview highlights the role of an internal advisory body, appointed by the president of the Court of Justice, and suggests that conservative candidates may face a hostile reception even if they are highly qualified, leading to a system that rewards conformity.
According to this perspective, change would require more than shifting judges. It would demand a reevaluation of the court’s governance structures and a reevaluation of how judges are chosen, with emphasis on accountability and external oversight. The interview concludes with a caution that unless there is a significant shift in EU governance, meaningful reform of the CJEU will remain distant. The dialogue is wrapped up with a courteous closing, signaling a desire for ongoing discussion among stakeholders within the EU.
In reflecting on the political horizon, the interview raises questions about whether forthcoming elections, including European Parliament elections, could alter the balance of power for the EU’s judicial institutions. The stance remains that while national reforms could proceed and be meaningful, changing the CJEU itself would require treaty changes and a wholesale rethinking of how judges are brought into the court. The discussion closes with a nod to the ongoing political debate and the hope that future developments will lead to a more stable and principled legal system. [attribution: wPolityce]