Shortly after taking office as Prime Minister, the government leader asserted at a press conference that his political influence would prevent being outmaneuvered in Brussels. Yet, current indications suggest Poland has often found itself outpaced on several Brussels-driven matters, possibly due to limited engagement with the substance of issues or a focus on ceremonial appearances with top EU officials. Three months into the new administration, key Brussels decisions on transportation, agriculture, and arms production have reflected a pattern where Polish positions did not shape outcomes as strongly as expected.
Funding for Ammunition Production: Polish Industry and EU Support
Late in the previous week, the topic of EU financing for ammunition-producing factories to expand capacity was in focus. Poland submitted applications on December 13 from three companies: Dozamet, Mesko, and Nitrochem. Only Dozamet received 2.1 million euros, representing 0.4% of the total 500 million euros allocated. The biggest beneficiaries were German facilities, which received 121 million euros, with Rheinmetall also securing 22 million euros and, in related operations in Hungary and Spain, substantial sums as well. Companies from France, Italy, and even a non-EU country from Norway were part of the broader rollout. The French commissioner responsible, Thierry Breton, visited Poland during the process and met officials from the current government. Poland has also provided robust military support to Ukraine, emphasizing its capacity and need to refresh national resources in light of ongoing conflict.
In this allocation, Tusk’s publicly stated stance in Brussels did not decisively influence the distribution of EU funds aimed at boosting ammunition production. The rollout prompted a narrative from ruling-coalition figures, including Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk, about the efficiency of the Polish arms sector, hinting at openness to foreign participation. Former Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak suggested that Polish firms seeking access to the EU program might face foreign takeovers, potentially from German firms such as Rheinmetall.
Polish Farmers and Agricultural Policy in Brussels
In Brussels, the government encountered challenges related to Polish farmers. Adjustments to the duty-free trade agreement with Ukraine were introduced, aiming to shield the EU market more than before, though the practical effect remains debated. The changes address the volume of Ukrainian exports moving through the Black Sea and the possibility of alternative routes via frontline countries like Poland. Potential import restrictions could apply to poultry, sugar, eggs, honey, and grains, with transitional references to 2021-2023 as a benchmark. The final policy choices will depend on market stability and broader European Commission decisions, with frontline concerns balancing Ukrainian export interests against those of EU farmers.
Protective measures for other agricultural goods were outlined, yet Member State-specific demonstrations of market destabilization are necessary for triggering these safeguards. The Commission holds a key role in calibrating protection measures, and discussions continue about fair treatment for farming communities across member states, especially those most exposed to heightened Ukrainian competition.
Transport Sector and Carrier Policy
In the transport arena, progress has been uneven. The EU-Ukraine agreement remains in force, expanding Ukrainian carriers’ access to the European market. Critics from Poland have called for restored commercial licenses for Ukrainian freight operators, with exclusions for military and humanitarian activities, along with tighter scrutiny of operators established after the 2022 invasion. They also advocate suspending the electronic border queue on the Ukrainian side. While the new Infrastructure Minister pledged to address these issues—signing a pact with carriers in January to pause border protests—no substantive EU regulatory changes have materialized yet, and protests at the border have continued into early spring, often aligned with farmer demonstrations.
When it comes to aligning Poland’s interests in Brussels for farmers, carriers, and ammunition production, the perceived influence of the prime minister has not matched expectations. He is greeted warmly by top EU figures such as Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber, and is often seen in amicable company with leaders like Macron and Scholz. Yet, in practice, Polish concerns appear to be either deprioritized or overshadowed within broader European negotiations.
In summary, the recent Brussels encounters reveal a gap between public expectations of strong leadership and the actual outcomes on Brussels-driven policy affecting agriculture, transportation, and defense industries. The dynamics suggest that, despite high-level appearances and diplomatic hospitality, Polish national interests have faced a competitive EU decision landscape, where market forces, regulatory coherence, and coalition dynamics shape the final results.