In the second stage of the process, the parliamentary majority accepts full responsibility for appointing the prime minister. Any action by the president at this point would likely be interpreted as a breach of the constitution, notes Prof. Anna Łabno, a constitutional expert. This perspective highlights how the balance of power shifts toward the Sejm when the first attempt to form a government does not yield success, and emphasizes that the president’s options are constrained by constitutional norms.
Public discourse, including remarks from politicians, journalists, and legal scholars, has focused on whether the president should refuse to appoint the candidate endorsed by the Sejm if Mateusz Morawiecki fails to secure a vote of confidence. The central argument ties to findings from a committee investigation into Russian influence on Poland’s internal security between 2007 and 2022. The report names the head of the Civic Platform as a figure who should not be entrusted with public functions tied to state security. This has sparked debate about whether those recommendations should influence presidential decisions in the second constitutional step.
On wPolsce.pl, Prof. Łabno was asked to comment on whether this line of reasoning should push the president toward violating the constitution. The professor suggested that using such a framing would misrepresent the constitutional framework. She argued that it is unlikely the president could legitimately refuse to appoint a government once the Sejm has designated a candidate and the process has progressed to the second step. The essence of this stage, she explained, is that if the first attempt fails, the initiative passes to the Sejm, which then enjoys full authority to determine the composition of the government. She noted that there is no provision allowing the Sejm President to intervene in a manner that would obstruct government formation.
When the question arose whether the committee’s advice was directed at the Sejm, Prof. Łabno replied with formal clarity. She stated that the committee’s statements were indeed addressed to the Sejm and its majority, and that the majority bears responsibility for establishing a government under a prevailing leadership, while also recognizing the cautions issued by the committee.
During the broader discussion, Prof. Łabno commented on the situation surrounding the President of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and the consideration of summoning and possibly suspending the bank’s head before the State Tribunal. She pointed out that the State Tribunal Act does not align with constitutional principles in this regard, and that the independence of the NBP President and the autonomy of the central bank must remain protected. The points she raised emphasize the delicate balance between constitutional procedures and the protection of institutional independence in Poland’s constitutional order.
In related reflections, commentators have examined the potential implications of appointing a prime minister who commands the support of the Sejm, and how this alignment affects the government’s legitimacy and stability. The discussion underscores the importance of constitutional clarity in the transition between government formation stages, ensuring that each step respects the roles assigned to the president, the Sejm, and the judiciary. The overarching theme is that constitutional safeguards exist to prevent overreach while enabling the elected representatives to fulfill their mandate in forming a functioning government.
Overall, the exchange places emphasis on procedural fidelity and the separation of powers. It frames the second step not as a political trap but as a defined constitutional path where the Sejm’s authority becomes decisive after the initial failed attempt, and where actions taken by the president must remain within constitutional bounds to preserve state security, institutional independence, and democratic legitimacy.