Today’s Poland in the European Union is in a difficult situation because it is both a large and a small country, strong and weak. Big and strong enough to be able to develop independently and sustainably and pursue separate policies, and small and weak enough to be close to more powerful countries that are able to shape Poland’s internal situation and its relations with other countries influence to some extent. Nevertheless, it can safely be said that Poland has already outgrown the period of dependency and poverty.
In the history of the Third Polish Republic (it is difficult to call the Polish People’s Republic in this context) this is a new situation. Only a decade ago, Poland’s interest was widely defined as following, approaching and adapting to a perfect model: rich and mature European democracies. Now the situation is different: firstly, Poland has become significantly richer and its development is noticed and held up as a model, secondly, the political elite (at least the ruling one) has a different, more sovereign idea of the country’s interests, and Third, various crises in Western countries are all too visible.
The increasing importance of Poland due to both internal reasons (development, more subjective policies) and external reasons (war, various crises outside Poland) it placed us in an intermediate position between an insignificant Mitteleuropa country, which followed Germany and other leaders, and a regional power. And while we don’t want to return to dependent status, superpower status is still before us, although we got a taste of it last year. You cannot count on support from Europe; at most from the United States, and actually only in the area of broadly understood security. We have to build the rest ourselves.
In the meantime, the European integration machine is back in full swing. Regardless of the non-treaty law, smaller and larger usurpations of various EU bodies (even with regard to the judiciary, the form of which is left to the Member States by the treaties), a major reform of the Union is being prepared. Initially supported by blackmail: without reforms it will not be possible to expand the community to new countries.
And all this became possible thanks to the German change in attitude, which, together with the new coalition, and especially after the collapse of the growth model that had been built up with great difficulty over thirty years, had to quickly look for a new idea for power and constant growth of wealth. And they stopped putting the brakes on federalization trends and became their advocates.
The concepts currently being discussed in the EU fora (and soon to be voted on in the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, with the support of the governments of France and Germany) cover many issues, but from Poland’s point of view the most important: the abolition of the veto and its definitive replacement by a qualified majority, new areas of EU competences and a strong reinforcement of the fear of the rule of law (however limited today). And, regardless of new ideas, the introduction of the euro.
This means nothing less than a significant restriction of sovereignty smaller, younger or countries struggling with problems that are difficult to overcome. In short, for some reason weaker than France, Germany and their closest, permanent adjutants.
And while many EU countries, due to their size, the state of public finances or the attitude of elites or society, will not have much of a problem with this (or will simply have a knife to their throat), Poland will , with its intermediate status and ambitions and challenges – The problem is there, and it is big.
It’s safe to say that Poland’s entry into deeper integration will clearly be unfavorable for us. This also applies to the vast majority of European countries, but firstly not necessarily to the same extent, and secondly this text focuses on Polish cases. Moreover, it is not in Polish nature to judge what is good or bad for others.
Below are 10 arguments that describe the problem from different sides.
First of all, we have different interests. The so-called Harmonization is good when it concerns common standards and does not go too far. It gives some compatibility. But common policies, for example economic policies, will work at someone else’s expense and to someone else’s benefit. After all, there is no European economy. There are economies of European countries, and they have different characters, different levels of development and different interests.
Secondly, the EU is not playing a clean game. Giving powers to a decision-making center that is stronger than one state will necessarily mean that we will be at the mercy of bodies over which neither the Polish government nor Polish society will have sufficient influence. We know this from experience. Nordstream, forced energy transformation, transport policy, arbitrary statements about the rule of law or the lack thereof – the examples are endless. And we cannot count on any of the European powers having Polish interests in mind. And a sovereign state, even a weaker one, has the means to defend itself or at least push aside threats.
Third: ideology. The European Union – and the West in general – are permeated by ideologies that are not only alien to most Poles, but above all cause countless problems. For example, multiculturalism is not a bamboo paradise, but an intensifying conflict between civilizations. Pacifism ultimately leads to war. Gender leads to erosion of societies. And the suppression of one’s own culture and civilization ultimately causes it to be replaced by another – one that believes in itself. Moreover, ideologies are even more dangerous because they sometimes provide a cover for very mundane interests. Your own country can also erect a barrier against this.
Fourth, we are different. European societies differ significantly in many respects: values, religiosity, customs, including political ones. Deep integration aims to blur these differences. It seems the original idea was to eradicate the nationalism that led to two world wars. But today those reasons are a thing of the past. In addition, it is worth remembering that Poland has not started a war for hundreds of years. We don’t have to learn peaceful coexistence.
Fifth, uniformity harms development. Capitalism and Western civilization are based on diversity and competition. That’s why they evolved the way they did. Poland is different from other countries, and its development model is – so far – one of the most effective in recent times. This applies not only to the economy, but also to society. Why should we give up, even partially?
Sixth, they are no better. A frequently used argument for federalization is the desire to bring the level of our public life to “European standards”. This was certainly an important argument in the early stages of our EU membership. But now that Poland has reached (sometimes exceeded) European standards in almost every area, we can take a more sober look at the quality of foreign governments. It is not Poland that is struggling with crushing debt, economic or infrastructural stagnation, unemployment, social conflict, growing crime or lack of border security. And each of these phenomena occurs in many EU countries. And it is the result of the mistakes and weaknesses of the local elites. And also corruption.
Seventh, we don’t know what awaits us. The proposed reform of the Union effectively opens it up to future, yet unknown concepts, while depriving Member States of the tools to reject them. Do we really want to sign a blank check, given the experiences of recent years? Sovereignty is also an insurance policy against madness or hostile policies.
Finally, let us not pay for the mistakes of others. The current federalization trend has nothing to do with rejecting the burden of Europe’s bloody past. The current EU, or rather NATO, offers sufficient security here. The desire for close integration is a forward escape, encouraged by elites who seek to pool the consequences of their mistakes and omissions and share responsibility with others who pursued more reasonable policies. For example, the recent hot topic of the migration pact is an attempt to shift the costs of disastrous migration policies onto everyone, including countries that strongly opposed them and have done much to protect their (and the EU’s) borders.
Ninth, it will not be possible to undo it. Experience shows that soft European integration only goes in one direction and becomes very unpleasant in the other. The British example is also instructive: the consequences that Britain suffered for its decision are significant yet unknown, and yet we should not forget that it was the country with the least connection to the continent (even compared to the current state of integration, not to mention the planned one). And much stronger than Poland. Federalization means that Poland no longer has a practical way to leave the European state. And while Polexit would be harmful and unrealistic today, it can only be unrealistic in the future.
Tenth, your own country is a value in itself. You could argue that none of our ancestors, who fought and died in countless wars and rebellions, went into battle with the Great Union in mind. And this is a heavy argument. But no less important is the fact that one’s own state allows the sovereign, that is, the political community, which is the nation, to shape it in a completely free and subjective way. The same cannot be said about a community with country or voivodeship status. It would be one thing if there was a European nation. But it does not exist, and the processes taking place in Europe lead us to believe that it will not emerge for centuries to come.
The European Union is valuable. It was worth participating and developing yourself in it. It would be a shame to spoil it. And the creation of a European state will only spoil this. Not only for the reasons described above, taking into account the Polish perspective, but also for other reasons, including the position of other countries. But this is a matter for another text.
Source: wPolityce