Vladimir Putin’s actions show that he is avoiding risky decisions that could threaten his power in Russia or spark an international escalation in the conflict with Ukraine, the American Institute for War Studies (ISW) estimates in its latest report.
Fear of risk
The maximalist and unrealistic goals Putin has set for his military, namely the conquest of all of Ukraine, probably require more risk to have any chance of success
— evaluate the IHO analysts in their report.
The ISW comes to the conclusion that
Putin’s reluctance to take risks in a conventional war in Ukraine indicates that he is very unlikely to pursue a nuclear escalation or war with NATO.
The decisions made after the invasion began on February 24 last year show a disconnect between his maximalist goals and his willingness to make the risky decisions necessary to achieve those goals.
Putin’s misconceptions
In February 2022, according to analysts, Putin most likely acted under the mistaken belief that the Russian military could force Kiev to surrender without significant losses, seeing the invasion itself as a limited and acceptable risk.
The ISW cites a number of data proving that the Kremlin was counting on a quick and easy victory, e.g. plans by the Russian military and intelligence services’ expectations regarding a quick surrender of Ukraine and its military defeat, as well as ignoring, for example, the warnings from the Central Bank of Russia about the potential cost of Western sanctions.
Russia’s defeat in the Battle of Kiev, and with it the failure of the Kremlin’s war plan, forced Putin to make difficult decisions in a costly and protracted conventional war. Putin, however, remained reluctant to order the difficult military and social changes likely needed to salvage his war
– writes ISW, pointing out that a number of “pragmatic actions” necessary from this point of view have been “ignored, delayed or only partially introduced” by the Russian dictator.
Among other things, it is about postponing mobilization, declaring a “partial” mobilization to keep most of the population out of the war, as well as conducting a “special military operation” to avoid war and martial law to declare.
Take care of your own image
The Interior Institute estimates that despite military defeats in the fall of 2022, Putin “continued to choose relatively less risky options”. According to analysts, this was motivated by fears for his own image, which could suffer from the rising cost of war to society.
The think tank estimates that a number of reforms in the military and weapons complex have been delayed, and that Putin is now “apparently reluctant to announce a second wave of mobilizations” and leaning toward “silent mobilization,” according to US and Western officials. so as not to increase public discontent.
At the same time, Putin has avoided public actions that would tie him directly to responsibility for the war and expose him to criticism, choosing scapegoats for this role, such as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu or military commanders.
The ISW reiterates previous assessments that “Russian threats regarding a conventional war with NATO do not match Russia’s (real) capabilities, and nuclear threats are mainly used to intimidate the West.”
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Source: wPolityce