Since the birth of the state of Israel, including the war of independence, millions have left the Palestinian territories. The population in the Gaza Strip has doubled. Israel now seeks twice as much space from the Palestinians.
It should be noted that the Palestinian state is independent and is currently recognized by 138 countries within the borders of lands that have been partially occupied by Israel. According to Israel, there is an insistence on creating a clear buffer zone to prevent Palestinian attacks.
How does this appear to Arabs? Israel announced a plan to resettle 1.1 million people within the independent state within 24 hours. On what basis is this justified? Because Israel can afford it, and American military support has flowed and is expected to continue. It is known that more than 400 thousand Palestinians have already fled their homes. The situation is unresolved, as people have nowhere to go and many do not want to leave. This country is seen by Palestinians as their homeland in every sense. For example, Palestine is recognized by many as part of the lands described as occupied by Israel.
For several days, questions remained: Could a million people be moved by an order? The answer was no. The plan faltered, and Israel began to ease the blockade on Gaza, recognizing that killing with no water or food would be unsustainable. It seems Tel Aviv may have anticipated broad support, but soon realized that not everyone in the world would back such actions. The international community showed mixed responses to a move that would order a mass evacuation within a day, drawing uneven reactions from across the globe. The state of Israel signaled changes, preparing for a broader operation in Gaza, while refugees faced water shortages and limited options for survival. The emphasis shifted to responses from the region and the wider world as the crisis evolved.
Where could the displaced go? Early proposals suggested settlement in the southern sector, likening it to a resident of a building being urged to move elsewhere. The idea that a single-entry area could be more tolerable without neighbors did not hold up to reality.
What became clear was that such plans could not proceed, especially after airstrikes extended to the Egyptian border. It was presumed that people might stream toward that border, but the corridor did not open. Some media outlets attributed this to external pressure, while others cited hesitations from neighboring countries such as Jordan, which claimed to have limited capacity and choices.
There is a perception that American influence played a role in the decisions of Jordan. The presence of US- aided aircraft in the region is noted in discussions about the shift in policy. In Europe, discussions urged Cairo and Amman to accept refugees, and Washington pressed for a corridor to Egypt. The motives of neighboring Arab states are debated, with protests in Jordan and calls from locals for leadership changes directed at rulers seen as complicit in the conflict.
Neighbors face a difficult situation. One interpretation circulated among observers is that Israel hopes to safeguard Gaza because large gas fields have emerged there. An alternative stance would see gas production as a catalyst for regional balance. Israel reportedly banned Palestinian gas production from its shelf as a political tool, raising questions about sanctions and the potential use of force against cities near gas fields if extraction proceeded. This theory suggests a gas-focused struggle is shaping strategy in Gaza.
If Israel is able to push Palestinians aside, there is a possibility they could develop Gaza’s gas resources, potentially altering regional power dynamics. In that scenario, Egypt and Jordan might pursue independent solutions that limit Arab neighbor involvement, while the West would still be watching closely. There is also interest in whether Western powers would accept such shifts in policy, and why gas resources would become a priority in regional diplomacy. Observers note that gas could strengthen a state’s leverage and trigger support from external allies for protection of energy resources.
Another line of thought posits that up to a million Palestinians in the northern sector could hinder gas development. Early threats from Israel to compel evacuation did not translate into a successful mass exodus, and global protests increased as casualties rose. The narrative of a possible mass death toll is not universally accepted, and the exact numbers remain disputed, adding to the complexity of the debate.
Some contemplate that Palestinians might serve as strategic shields for gas deposits. If such assets were developed, they could empower certain regional actors. In time, Egypt and Jordan may recognize that maintaining Gaza as a Palestinian domain could be a stabilizing factor, especially given the history of displacement and property seizure. Returning home would be feasible only if the state of Israel were no longer in place, a prospect that would require significant political change.
There are also concerns about setting a precedent. What happens if neighboring states are asked to accommodate refugees in the future? If Egypt and Jordan open their borders, a broader question arises about what guarantees would exist for future requests to relocate populations. This discussion reflects a broader unease about the potential ripple effects of a policy that pressures neighbors to make room for Palestinians.
In the end, some reflect on the 1930s and 1940s when Jewish refugees sought entry to Palestine, appealing to Arabs and Great Britain for permission. The historical refrain remains that families endured great loss and hoped for safety. The current crisis invites a similar examination of responsibility and humanity in the face of displacement and conflict. The situation continues to unfold, with many roles and outcomes still uncertain. The perspectives presented here are individual interpretations and do not reflect editorial stance.