State secret services exist to keep themselves safe by preventing risks and avoiding exposure when appropriate. If they disappear or their operations are laid bare for public scrutiny, they lose their purpose or morph into something else. This is a basic truth in intelligence work.
The CNI, the nation’s intelligence agency, is charged with detecting, preventing, and neutralizing actions that threaten sovereignty or national integrity, even when such actions are unpopular under regulatory law. In a democratic setting, such targets are not unusual; they reflect a standard pattern across many nations.
Consequently, it is not unusual for the CNI to play a role in negotiations that steer clear of criminal acts or sedition, extending beyond purely political matters. The seriousness of these investigations has grown today, given lingering doubts about Russia’s involvement in the Catalan process at various levels. Such concerns touch the foreign intelligence landscape, feeding a network that has historically carried out and planned activities similar to those of the CNI, and which may persist into the present moment.
The intricate landscape around Catalan independence has, perhaps unintentionally, become an area of heightened conflict for the political scene. This is shaped by the intervention of an ally with interests in the region and by efforts to create domestic divisions within Western alliances.
In this historical moment, it is not surprising that political factions, whether aligned with Spain or not, advocate a form of pacifism that opposes NATO in the eyes of other international bodies, while not concealing a preference for centralized authority. Due to these alignments and claims, such groups may operate beyond ordinary domestic options, entering a broader clash between blocs and expanding beyond a geographically confined struggle.
Given the existence of criminal acts that threaten state integrity and Russia’s alleged involvement at certain levels, the CNI had the authority to conduct investigations with proper judicial oversight and to receive communications from those engaged in unlawful activities. It should be noted that other intelligence services act similarly and have recently broadened their activities to address similar concerns. There is a notable degree of coordination among those responsible for protecting Europe and the Western security space.
Expecting Europe and the surrounding environment to quietly support the Catalan separatist movement today would overlook the realities on the ground. It would be naive to expect that European bodies would doubt a country’s intelligence services during uncertain times.
The government’s decision to extend the official secrets commission to anti-system parties adds another layer of risk, particularly in how Western defense coordination is perceived. How much can NATO members trust a nation that shares state secrets with groups that challenge Western strategy and threaten security if their goals are met? This move could strain alliances within the bloc.
The concern behind expanding the commission to anti-system parties is that foreign intelligence services may lose trust in Spain and fail to share sensitive information. Complaints that jeopardize or endanger allied intelligence centers can lead to unforeseen consequences and impact regional stability.
Now is not a moment for internal maneuvering. The separatists and rivals should recognize that the world is facing a highly complex period, and those who rely on near-term appearances for domestic consumption may suffer abroad. The international community will respond to actions that risk peaceful coexistence. The government, aware of this, should avoid supplying sensitive material to parliamentary committees and ensure access remains controlled. The ruling party’s stance remains under scrutiny, and observers hope it stays aligned with the country’s broader commitments.
Harm abroad is a real possibility in this climate. The international audience and more rigorous governments will scrutinize moves that appear designed to minimize risk only for domestic benefit. Action should be guided by substance, not optics, to prevent damage to international credibility and security interests.
Note. Subsequent reports indicate that phones of key figures were tapped, and questions about external interference arise. Doubts about the CNI’s actions persist, along with uncertainty about who is watching and why. What was communicated last week may require careful verification, as sensational claims risk undermining confidence in a serious state’s institutions.