Is it Europe’s interest to let the war in Ukraine drag on? That question lingers, even if most players are not eager for a prolonged conflict at this moment. What remains clear is that this issue is driven by the United States, which, while not fighting on European soil, wields influence through NATO and the alliance’s structure.
Washington’s stated objective, echoed by President Joe Biden, is to curb Russia’s capacity for new military adventures and to prevent any effort at regime change. At present, the war largely serves American strategic aims: new markets for oil and liquefied gas, higher profits from energy, and a boost to advanced military technology through NATO enlargement.
Some European voices have pushed back against Western sanctions on Moscow, with Hungary standing out as a relatively independent line. Yet most allies have aligned with Washington, shaping a united front in economic and political responses to the conflict.
The broader aim for the United States has been to preserve its long-standing strategic leadership over Europe, a position that has been challenged in recent years as NATO cohesion comes under stress. A key element in this calculus has been preventing any convergence between Western Europe and Russia, particularly given Germany’s energy dependence and Russia’s role as a major industrial state.
The looming question is the cost Europe would bear if the war continues. Deep economic and social sacrifices could become unavoidable, a scenario many observers fear. This perspective is shared by notable figures in European business circles, including Carlo De Benedetti, a renowned Italian entrepreneur associated with Fiat, Olivetti, and the founding of the publishing group L’Espresso, as reported in Il Corriere della Sera.
De Benedetti has been candid about his view of Russian President Vladimir Putin, calling him a criminal and a thief who has misappropriated national wealth. Yet he also underscored a divergence in interests among the United States, Great Britain, and Europe, particularly Italy, suggesting that European priorities may not always align with Washington’s strategic goals.
He recalled a substantial aid package approved by the U.S. Congress for Ukraine, totaling around 33 billion dollars, with roughly 20 billion earmarked for weapons. He described that level of support as a sign that the United States is preparing for a long, drawn-out conflict, a trajectory that would place heavy burdens on Ukraine and the broader European economy.
In contrast, De Benedetti argued that Europe has a shared interest in stopping the conflict rather than fueling it. He suggested that if Washington aims to use Ukraine to topple Putin, that choice lies with them, not Europe. His view is that Europe should carve out its own strategic path on the world stage, leveraging economic strength and social cohesion to advance democratic models rather than relying solely on military exports as a means of promotion.
From his perspective, Putin’s objective to rebuild a Soviet-style order is improbable. Russia, with around 140 million people, is not economically stronger than several European economies once energy resources are excluded. Its military efficiency, too, has shown serious weaknesses and organizational failures in recent conflicts.
De Benedetti also reflected on the origins of NATO, noting that the alliance formed under circumstances very different from today, before the European Union existed and long before China emerged as a global actor. He advocated for the creation of a European defense capacity, a common security approach that would allow Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own safety.
However, such a shift faces real obstacles. The former Warsaw Pact members, especially Poland, appear to rely heavily on the American security umbrella and may resist moves toward greater European military autonomy. This reality complicates any move toward a stronger, independent European defense framework.