The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has renewed a long-standing European debate: does the European Union need its own independent deterrent, or is the US security shield still sufficient for the continent?
With the departure of Britain, which had not always aligned with every EU stance, France remains the sole European nation with a nuclear arsenal and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Back in the mid-twentieth century, Konrad Adenauer, the first postwar German chancellor, and Franz Josef Strauss, then Bavaria’s defense minister, engaged in early discussions about collective security with France and Italy. Their aim was to consider a Europe where defense mattered collectively rather than relying exclusively on outside guarantees.
As Der Spiegel recalls, in November 1957 Strauss signed a discreet agreement with his French and Italian counterparts aimed at steering Europe toward military independence from the United States. The plan encountered resistance from Charles de Gaulle, who insisted France would pursue its own nuclear capability and not share it with European partners, a move that complicated any joint deterrent scheme. [Der Spiegel]
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw widespread protests in Germany against what activists described as the “double NATO resolution” tied to the deployment of Pershing II missiles and US cruise missiles in Germany in response to Soviet SS-20s. The domestic debate fractured the Social Democratic party, contributing to the collapse of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1982 and the ascent of Helmut Kohl, who led a Christian Democratic government.
Until the current conflict in Ukraine, many leaders within the German Social Democratic party, including the parliamentary group head, opposed Berlin’s plan to acquire new fighters capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The shift began after Russia’s invasion, with the new SPD-Green-Liberal coalition signaling a pivot toward enhanced defense, including support for American-made F-35 fighters that could project force if needed on Russian territory.
Yet, even as Germany leaned toward a stronger Atlantic alignment, questions linger about the reliability of the US nuclear shield in the long term, especially amid uncertainties about future U.S. leadership and the durability of transatlantic commitments. Russia’s demonstrated military capabilities remain a factor in these calculations, underscoring a strategic environment that is far from static.
Some German strategists have long argued that France should reconsider its doctrine and share nuclear capabilities with other EU states that lack their own nuclear forces, a concept that would require significant political and legal coordination.
Christoph Heugen, a veteran diplomat who advised Chancellor Angela Merkel and now chairs the Munich Security Conference, has urged the EU to elevate its own defense posture. Heugen has emphasized the need to explore a shared deterrence framework with France and other partners, including how to integrate planning and decision-making for any potential operation against a hostile power. [Der Spiegel]
Germany and other EU members could, in theory, support the French force de frappe through financial contributions in exchange for Paris granting consultations on both planning and execution within a broader European deterrence strategy. However, this remains a delicate proposition, given France’s sensitivity about sovereignty and its own strategic calculus.
Even if Paris were receptive to such a shared approach, analysts warn that France’s current arsenal—primarily strategic submarines with limited numbers of active units—may not be enough to deliver a decisive second blow in a hypothetical nuclear confrontation. Moreover, unlike Russia and the United States, France does not possess a full spectrum of tactical weapons, which in some scenarios could escalate or de-escalate a conflict more flexibly.
Experts argue that flexible deterrence options are essential when facing Russia’s capabilities. A purely blunt response would risk triggering a broader conflict with catastrophic consequences for the European continent. The goal remains to deter aggression while avoiding the worst possible outcome for civilian populations and regional stability.
In the end, a prolonged war with uncertain outcomes harms everyone and serves only those who profit from political bloodshed and the instability they create. The broader European interest is to pursue clear, credible defense arrangements that reduce dependency on any single ally while strengthening collective resilience across borders. [Anthology of European Security Discourse]