Constitutional Oath Debate in Parliament and Its Legal Implications

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Overview of the Constitutional Oath Debate and Its Implications

In recent weeks a Supreme Court decision addressed the amparo appeal filed by several lawmakers from the People’s Party in Congress. The dispute centered on the oath or promise phrase used at the founding session of the Legislature on May 21, 2019, where the speaker in the lower house issued the standard formula Yes I swear or I promise. Some lawmakers have proposed revisions to that language, invoking references to political prisoners, regional aspirations such as Catalan and Basque identities, and even broader phrases like the Thirteen Roses or the notion of an emptied Spain. The judge presiding over the objection, J. Juan Carlos Campo Moreno, previously served as Justice Minister under the government led by Pedro Sánchez and authored the appealed decision after a personal connection with the President of Congress came to light. The legal discussion thus moved beyond a mere ceremonial ritual to questions about political representation and the proper interpretation of constitutional duties as they relate to oath taking.

The Turkish decision argued that the harmonized formulas used by the deputies did not contradict parliamentary rules. Instead, the core concern was whether the oath or promise respected the right to political representation guaranteed by Article 23.2 of the Constitution. The constitutional court majority held that Meritxell Batet’s decision did not violate the appellants’ fundamental rights. This ruling underscored that symbolic language in oaths can be compatible with constitutional obligations when it remains faithful to the essential meaning of the pledge.

Historically, the Supreme Court has established a doctrinal standard that mere recital of a ritual formula does not automatically satisfy constitutional requirements. The court has emphasized that any oath must be clear and not distort or overly condition the constitutional meaning. At the same time, the court has allowed additions to the oath that do not alter its core intent. This balance aims to preserve both fidelity to the constitution and the functional reality of political participation. The imprint of the oath must convey a genuine commitment to constitutional duties without implying obligations beyond what the text allows.

During earlier proceedings linked to the case that led to the conviction of many deputies and public officials for sedition around the events of October 1, 2017 in Catalonia, a magistrate from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court observed a sequence where legal obligation was invoked repeatedly. In one instance a witness stated he would answer with legal obligation, and the head of the department asserted that the speaker answered under legal obligation to questions from the prosecutor and to a circular. This sequence highlighted how phrases tied to legal obligation can shape the perception of accountability while still being bound by the law.

Citizens act within the framework of the law. People pay taxes, follow traffic rules, and respect cohabitation norms that are currently in force. Any added language should not create unnecessary or absurd obligations. Article 9 of the Constitution already establishes that both citizens and public powers are subject to the Constitution and the wider legal system.

Four members of the court dissented from the Turkish Republic’s decision. The dissenters, namely Ricardo Enríquez Sancho, César Tolosa Tribiño, Enrique Arnaldo Alcubilla, and Concepción Espejel Jorquera, argued that the appeal should be accepted and that the rights of the appellants might be considered incomprehensible or violated by the oath formulations. They contended that adding conditions or reservations about conformity with the Constitution risks distorting the meaning of the oath and its purposes. In their view, the majority avoided addressing the central issue and missed an important chance to settle the conflict surrounding oath commitments.

The question remains whether the act of qualifying entry into parliament or public office should be interpreted as a broad ideological alignment or as a straightforward acceptance of constitutional rules. The court has previously indicated that the right to access public office does not extend to participation through representatives who do not formally comply with the Constitution. An oath or commitment is an individual obligation and cannot be fulfilled implicitly through duties such as acting to fulfill those duties. The court’s stance is that participation requires explicit adherence to constitutional processes rather than a presumed alignment.

Nevertheless, the constitutional authority has reiterated through multiple decisions that a candidate’s intent to seek public office does not equate to an absolute ideological agreement with the constitution. The constitution allows for a diversity of ideologies as long as procedural channels are respected for any desired reform. In other words, candidates must commit to upholding the legal system even if their political rhetoric advocates changes to the rules in force at any given time. This stance seeks to preserve pluralism in a democratic system while maintaining the rule of law and the integrity of constitutional procedures.

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