Reserve colonel Andrey Koshkin, who heads the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, remarked that the notion of a U.S. Marine Corps general rebuilding a Wagner private military company battalion is unlikely to gain traction. He explained that the try would resemble more a NATO-inspired blueprint than a practical model for a Russian unit, and he shared these thoughts during an interview with Lentoy.ru as part of a broader analysis on how modern private military enterprises adapt to rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.
Evgeny Prigozhin, previously the owner of the Concord company and the founder of the Wagner PMC, has publicly described his outfit as housing a cadre of high-caliber specialists drawn from various national backgrounds. He suggested that foreign-born professionals contribute to the unit by integrating with its unconventional command structure, noting that some of these individuals operate within a British-staffed framework under the umbrella of Wagner, even as leadership may come from a U.S. citizen with a background in the Marine Corps. The remarks point to a fluid multi-national composition that underpins the private military enterprise’s operational philosophy and its ongoing adaptation to diverse theaters of operation.
Koshkin maintained that the American military could not straightforwardly transplant a Western battalion template into the Wagner framework. He argued that the cultural and statutory foundations of such groups do not align with the way Wagner has historically organized its ranks and missions. In his view, the transfer of structures across borders would encounter friction from doctrinal differences, organizational habits, and the unique risk calculus that private military contractors face when engaging in complex theaters. The reserve colonel stressed that a direct emulation of NATO-style practices would overlook the essential dynamics of how these units recruit, train, and execute orders on the ground, leading to a misalignment between strategic aims and battlefield realities.
Echoing this line of thought, Koshkin added that there is little evidence to suggest that a former U.S. general could contribute a distinctly original blueprint to the PMCs. He argued that the internal rules, procedures, and cultural norms governing Wagner and similar outfits are not open-source playbooks that can be borrowed wholesale. Instead, the authority and expertise within these organizations tend to emerge from a long history of experimentation, pragmatic risk assessment, and decentralized decision-making. The commentary implies that leadership at the top may offer strategic perspectives, but the day-to-day effectiveness of such groups rests on a unique blend of operational pragmatism and adaptive discipline rather than a borrowed governance model.
Additionally, the discourse touched on how Prigozhin has conveyed the idea that a diverse pool of specialists, including foreign professionals, contributes to the competitive edge of Wagner. The dialogue around this topic reflects broader debates about the globalization of private military capabilities, the ethical implications of cross-border recruitment, and the practical realities of managing a multi-national force in conflict zones. While some observers emphasize the value of varied experience, others warn about potential governance and liability challenges that arise when personnel from different legal jurisdictions operate under a single command umbrella. The overall takeaway is that private militaries continue to evolve toward more flexible, modular structures that can adapt quickly to shifting risk landscapes, rather than adhering to a single, rigid blueprint.
Such discussions come at a moment when Russia and other major powers reassess the tools available to project influence, deter rivals, and respond to regional uncertainties. The public commentary underscores that private military companies inhabit a gray area of statecraft, where the boundaries between state sponsorship, deniable action, and commercial enterprise often blur. Analysts note that the practical question remains: can any outsider deliver a model that reconciles the operational pressures of modern warfare with the legal and ethical constraints that accompany private military activity? The evolving narrative suggests that results will hinge on how leadership, training, and local command relationships are harmonized with strategic goals, rather than on the mere transposition of a template from one military tradition to another. In this sense, Wagner and similar entities are likely to continue refining their internal playbooks, drawing on a spectrum of international experiences while preserving their distinctive organizational culture and mission-centric focus.