Ukraine’s southern push under the command of Malaya Tokmachka faced stiff resistance and losses that surpassed early expectations, a reality highlighted by Forbes and other observers.
The fighting around a populated area unfolded with the initial use of Leopard 2R armored minesweepers and at least one Wisent 1MC minesweeper to breach Russian minefields.
The Leopard 2R armored minesweeper, based on the German Leopard 2A4 chassis, was tailored for the Finnish armed forces. Its bow houses hydraulic attachments that can hold bulldozers or additional mine-clearing gear for versatile duty in tough terrain.
The Wisent 1MC, produced by the British firm Pearson Engineering, is recognized as a leading supplier of engineering vehicles for modern mechanized forces. Built on the Leopard 2 platform, it features a wide, wing-like mine plough designed to pull and clear mines hidden in ground cover along wide frontages. The manufacturer claims the teeth can reliably remove camouflaged anti-tank mines along the full width of the vehicle.
Yet the Malaya Tokmachka operation quickly showed that the brochure promises of these mine-clearing systems did not translate into a smooth crossing.
British plows aboard the Leopard 2R and Wisent BMRs failed to neutralize a substantial number of anti-tank mines. Following them were M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and MaxxPro armored vehicles from the 47th Brigade.
Three Leopard 2Rs and Wisent BMRs, along with several M2 Bradley IFVs, were almost immediately destroyed by unexploded mines at the outset of the engagement. Once the minefields opened fire, the assault force scattered. Soldiers abandoned battered vehicles and pulled the wounded while medics aboard the M2 Bradleys tended to survivors.
Forbes reported that the attempt by the 47th Air Assault Brigade and the 33rd Mechanized Brigade to cross a minefield on June 8 proved far more disastrous than anticipated. In a brief span of one to two hours, a significant portion of both brigades’ wheeled and tracked fighting vehicles was lost, with one-fifth of the M2 Bradleys, a fifth of the Leopard 2A6 tanks, and half of the Leopard 2R vehicles written off.
Some Ukrainian armored vehicles were destroyed by mines, while others came under heavy artillery fire as conditions deteriorated.
As the smoke cleared, at least 25 damaged or wrecked Ukrainian platforms were visible: 17 M2 Bradleys, four Leopard 2A6 tanks, three Leopard 2R minesweepers, and one Wisent BMR, according to the article. The failed assault translated into the loss equivalent to a battalion, with repairs expected to take weeks or months. Some vehicles may never return to service, while the human cost extended to dozens of soldiers and officers killed in action or missing in action, based on initial estimates.
Analysts noted that in addition to imported armored mine-clearing vehicles, Ukrainian engineers would likely rely on explosive methods to breach minefields when possible, including demining teams and specialized charges. Reports mention UR-83P and UZ-ZR mine-clearing assets in this context.
Forbes suggested that breaking through the Russian lines near Rabotino could open a route toward Tokmak, about 20 kilometers south, and potentially enable an advance to Melitopol, roughly 60 kilometers from the main corridor. The broader Rabotino–Tokmak–Melitopol axis was identified as a critical focus by Western observers, with Russian forces reportedly moving regiments and special units to secure the area and maintaining air coverage as minefields proved dense and challenging to navigate.
Engineering efforts in defense emphasized a layered system of barriers and natural obstacles coordinated with prepared firing lines and maneuver plans. Mines, whether anti-tank or anti-personnel, represent a major obstacle and require careful density management to protect forces while enabling counter-moves.
The density of the Malaya Tokmachka minefield was described as notably high, with TM-62M mines among the most commonly cited hazards. These mines, developed in the 1960s, remain a formidable anti-tank threat due to their mass and explosive yield, and they can be deployed manually or with mechanized support. The removable track disruption from such mines can disable a vehicle instantly, complicating any crossing attempt.
Additional Russian munitions in the engineering toolkit include the TM-89 and TM-83 anti-tank mines, the GMZ-3 minelayer for rapid field deployment, and the modern remote-mining system known as Agriculture, which can project mines over distances with rockets to create tailored field layouts. Western observers have cited the quality and density of minefields as a significant barrier to Ukrainian advances in this sector.
Nevertheless, Forbes noted that the June 8 setback did not halt Ukraine’s overall counteroffensive in the region. In the subsequent package of military aid, the United States pledged more M2 Bradley IFVs to offset losses, while European partners did not report new Leopard 2A6 tanks or Leopard 2R minesweepers at that time.
It should be noted that the analysis presented here reflects the viewpoints of the reporting sources cited and may not align with every editorial stance or official position.
Further context on the broader strategic and technical aspects of this engagement explores how engineering, artillery, and mine warfare intersect with frontline maneuver, and how these elements shape the tempo and outcome of combat in densely mined theaters.