The Kremlin is accelerating plans to fold newly seized lands into Russia in the near future, with Ukraine once again at the heart of the debate. Russian media has been echoing calls from those who want voting to happen in recent weeks, even in regions where the international community does not recognize any incorporation. On Wednesday, gazeta.ru published statistics about the alleged voting intentions in the Ukrainian region of Zaporizhzhia. Much of Zaporizhzhia remains under Russian military control, and the report claims that 82% of those voting would back joining the Eurasian state.
It is not limited to Zaporizhzhia. The Russian government reportedly plans to hold similar consultations in other occupied territories, including Kherson and Mariupol. Western outlets describe the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as already being under Kremlin influence since 2014, with a new round of appointments signaling further control. The appointment of four Russian ministers to the Donetsk People’s Republic government is seen as a clear move toward greater Moscow influence. Dmitry Shmelev, identified as a key figure in Moscow’s economic apparatus, is expected to oversee the flow of reconstruction funds.
Dmitri Pushilin, the de facto head of state in Donetsk, argued that the move would speed the shift to a Russian legal framework and governance model. He noted that Moscow has requested new powers from leaders on the ground, prompting the arrival of Russian executives to head several ministries. Additional portfolios for Russian officials include Education, Health, and Energy, roles previously held at the regional level within those borders.
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Similarly, officials from the neighboring country are already working on the ground in the self-proclaimed republics. Former Donetsk Foreign Minister Mikhail Kofman has even suggested that a vote could be held in September after the DPR and LPR are considered liberated.
As the Russification process intensifies, the annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk is unlikely to face bureaucratic hurdles for Moscow. A large share of residents there already hold Russian passports, with estimates around six hundred thirty thousand. Fabian Burkhardt, a senior researcher at the Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies, has noted that leaders in the self-proclaimed republics may eventually want to integrate their lands with Russia.
This scenario echoes the 2014 Crimea episode, when a referendum quickly led to integration with Russia, a move met with broad international opposition. In March of that year, after the Euromaidan movement and the appearance of armed personnel in the region, Crimea moved toward joining Russia, and Moscow celebrated with the slogan Crimea is ours.
Beyond Ukraine
Facing a prolonged conflict with the West and with Vladimir Putin still in power, the Kremlin is looking beyond Ukraine. In May, Anatoly Bibilov, the self-proclaimed head of South Ossetia, signaled readiness to join with the North Ossetian region, which many countries regard as part of Georgia, by holding a referendum to unite with Russia’s northern administrative division.
From the capital Tbilisi, Georgia, this move was condemned by the prime minister, Irakli Garibashvili, who warned that Georgia would not recognize any referendum held under those circumstances. After Bibilov lost the regional elections, his successor, Alan Gagloyev, suspended the consultation but argued for adjusting the mechanism with Moscow and the calendar, while remaining favorable to the idea of closer ties with Russia.
Abkhazia, another unrecognized state in the eyes of most of the world, has repeatedly asserted its intent to chart its own path while maintaining a close link to Russia. Former Abkhaz foreign minister Viacheslav Chirikba told a regional outlet that the region would preserve its autonomy even if the political landscape shifts in Moscow. At present, most exports flow to Russia, and the bulk of foreign investment comes from the northern neighbor.
Moldova’s Transnistria, a narrow strip east of the Dniester River, represents another lingering post-Soviet enclave with Moscow-directed influence. Political leaders in Transnistria have signaled a desire to realign with Russia, though the enclave’s geographical distance and economic ties pose ongoing challenges to any bold moves. Observers note that the larger shifts in Moscow’s strategy could alter the viability of such enclaves as Moscow’s leverage grows in the region.