Units and formations of the Russian Federation’s armed forces, along with irregular groups, continue offensive actions aimed at securing control of Bakhmut. In the city’s northwestern outskirts, battles persist around Orekhovo-Vasilievka and Bogdanovka, with both towns still under enemy control. The village of Khromovo remains in Ukrainian hands.
To the south of Bakhmut, fighting continues near Krasnoe and to the west of Kleshcheevka and Kurdyumovka. Hostilities do not subside within the city itself, in the southern part of the AZOM industrial zone near the city center, or in the southern districts of Bakhmut.
General Alexander Syrsky states that the adversary is weakening, which creates an opportunity for Ukrainian formations deployed in the Bakhmut area to mount a counteroffensive. There is also a plan to encircle and neutralize irregular groups pressing the city from the north.
Commonly, a counterattack is launched when offensive power is exhausted, reserves are depleted, and command and control are disrupted. Achieving fire and air superiority in the counterattack zone is a basic prerequisite, at least temporarily. These are straightforward textbook principles, yet selecting the optimal moment for a counterstrike remains challenging.
Operational success rests on discerning when the enemy’s offensive capability is spent, while smoke, fire, and loud weaponry create a chaotic picture and reports from troops are often incomplete or conflicting. Beyond solid intelligence, a high level of command intuition and foresight is required. The command post should be led by a capable commander, and the planning and execution of a counterattack must come from the highest echelons of military leadership.
For the advancing side, a well-coordinated Ukrainian counterattack would make defense by Russian units and irregular formations very difficult to sustain overnight. Defense and offense are distinct in practice. Engineering defenses are typically set up along the front line, including mine-explosive and non-explosive barriers.
Minefields contain explosive mines, anti-personnel and anti-tank devices, sometimes with controlled detonation. Non-explosive barriers include wire barriers, gouges, hedgehogs, perpendiculars, and struts. In defense, these barriers are arranged in front of the leading edge; in an offensive push, barriers along penetration sectors must be cleared to allow crossings through wire lines.
Clearing or bypassing minefields can slow a counterattack, and some obstacles can be restored by mobile units, but not all can be rebuilt quickly. A rapid counterstrike often cannot rely on full restoration of barriers.
Over time, it becomes very difficult for troops and formations that have conducted sustained offensives to switch to a defensive posture overnight. It is necessary to reorganize and form new operational groups, establish defense lines, zones, and positions, and deploy a comprehensive fire suppression system with updated tactics.
Defending lines are easier to fortify when the enemy is defeated and demoralized. If the opponent remains strong, proactive, and determined to counterattack, setting up a robust defense becomes much harder.
Time is a critical factor for fortifying defensive lines. For example, complete fortification for a combined arms division may require 12–15 days, and for an army, 20–22 days.
Classic defense lines often include three or four positions with a 2–2.5 km depth, spaced up to 4 km apart, and equipped with cutting positions. The core task is to excavate and reinforce, sometimes around the clock. Heavy equipment, demolition material, industrial resources, and local materials can be used, but hand labor remains essential for many tasks.
General Syrsky, together with his troops, could exploit the favorable conditions to strike a weakened adversary that has not yet fully fortified its defenses. The Ukrainian command’s stated intentions should be interpreted through strategic scenarios and prepared accordingly.
Note: The perspective presented reflects ongoing analysis and does not represent a formal position of any editorial authority.