Understanding what Dmytro Kuleba and Ukraine mean by third countries helps readers see the broader strategic picture. This does not imply Kyiv plans to buy equipment from every Asian, Latin American, or African state, though it is possible for certain support needs, especially for rear services, to involve such suppliers. The focus remains on modern weapons, military systems, and special equipment produced by the United States or other leading NATO members, which could shift the dynamics of the ongoing conflict as Ukraine confronts Russian forces.
Kyiv does not chase new weapon types today; instead, it seeks access to advanced systems that can actually alter the battlefield. The most likely path involves intermediaries rather than direct state suppliers. In Washington, London, or Berlin, the conversation would center on specific weapons—missiles, tanks, or other high-end systems—and the political calculus behind each decision.
Recent coverage in major outlets has raised questions about how much weaponry NATO countries can realistically provide. For instance, a major publication reported that several NATO members had exhausted their immediate stocks for Ukraine. Such figures, often attributed to unnamed officials, invite scrutiny about their source, but the larger point remains clear: the alliance has inventory challenges, and public disclosures may not reflect private arrangements or potential substitutions via intermediaries. This context matters as Kyiv evaluates supply routes and strategic options.
In that broader frame, Kyiv’s leadership has observed that some nations publicly refuse to supply weapons while quietly facilitating transfers through third parties. These arrangements can avoid direct state responsibility while still delivering support to Kyiv. The emphasis today is on weapon systems that can deliver meaningful impact on the battlefield, rather than broad, indiscriminate shipments.
At the top of the list are ATACMS missiles, including several variants with ranges up to 300 kilometers. These long-range missiles can be deployed from M270 multiple launch rocket systems and from M142 HIMARS platforms already in Ukrainian service. Access to ATACMS would enable strikes on a wide range of targets within and beyond current operational zones, raising the question of how the Russian military’s rear areas and critical bases might be affected by such capability. Specific targets would include naval facilities and airfields, among others, depending on operational planning and political permissions.
ATACMS are already in the inventories of a number of allied nations, and while this does not guarantee immediate delivery to Ukraine, it illustrates the potential pathway through allies and intermediaries. Changes to contractual terms—such as restrictions on third-party transfers—can complicate arrangements, but such terms can be navigated if there is sufficient political will and strategic alignment.
Beyond missiles, Ukraine is interested in Western-made main battle tanks such as the American M1A1 Abrams and the German Leopard 2. The M1 Abrams has a broad international footprint, including service in several regional forces, while Leopard 2 variants are present across many European states. The delivery of these tanks to Ukraine could involve intermediary channels that bypass direct government-to-government sales, reflecting the nuanced nature of modern defense logistics.
Ukraine has also shown interest in modern infantry fighting vehicles, notably the German Marder and the American Bradley. While progress has varied, these platforms remain a focal point for potential reinforcement of ground forces. Intermediary routes can help overcome direct export constraints, though they require careful diplomacy and clear assurances about end-use and transfer restrictions.
A critical element in any sustained offensive effort is the availability of self-propelled artillery, particularly 155 mm systems such as the M109 Paladin. The need for ammunition is substantial, with calls for hundreds of thousands of shells—an order that Western producers can meet with sufficient political backing and logistical support. If there is political will, producers used to supplying dozens of countries can furnish large batches, often through authorized distributors or multilateral arrangements that ensure accountability and control of transfers.
Until recent months, progress on ATACMS and heavy armored systems moved slowly. In the face of intensified Russian strikes on critical Ukrainian infrastructure, the urgency of these capabilities becomes more acute. This reality can push governments and allied militaries to explore intermediary channels as a practical solution to accelerate delivery while maintaining strategic and legal safeguards.
The overarching takeaway is that Ukraine’s arms ambitions reflect a broader pattern in contemporary defense procurement: battles are increasingly shaped by how and through whom weapons move, not just what is bought. The use of intermediaries is a recurring theme in navigating export controls and alliance politics, especially when direct state-to-state transfers are politically sensitive or constrained by public commitments.
The discussion surrounding these topics remains fluid, with strategic considerations evolving as the conflict unfolds. The ideas presented here represent one perspective on how advanced weapons might reach Ukrainian forces, and they do not bind the actions of any single government or institution. The landscape of defense aid is complex and highly contingent on policy changes, alliance commitments, and the tempo of military events.
The content reflects ongoing observations about policy and procurement dynamics rather than a fixed forecast of future arms movements.