The state-backed asset management vehicle Sareb was created in 2012 during the administration of Mariano Rajoy, with Luis de Guindos serving as economy minister. Its purpose was to act as a public-private instrument to absorb the troubled real estate holdings of failing savings banks, commonly described as a bad bank. The approach mirrored reforms seen in other countries, including Ireland, aiming to isolate the legacy of a real estate bubble inside a dedicated entity. The expected timeline was roughly fifteen years, and through the Regular Banking Restructuring Fund (Frob) the loans tied to real estate backers from the old savings banks were transferred into a mixed public-private company. Sareb began with a portfolio valued around 50 billion, though several analyses have noted that reported asset values may have overstated true worth.
Under the government now led by Pedro Sánchez, Sareb’s future remains under review, with Frob holding most control since 2022 after Eurostat required the Ministry of Economy to classify Sareb’s liabilities as public debt. Any determination about Sareb’s future will be a national decision and should not be interpreted as an EU or troika directive. Sareb continues to function as a public-private enterprise.
h2 Liquidation as the initial and least viable option
The first option under consideration is liquidation, which would involve a rapid sale of assets. The sale would likely reflect a sense of urgency rather than current market strength. The Sareb portfolio includes tangible assets such as built structures and land, in addition to loans that can be enforced with Sareb’s real estate serving as collateral.
Liquidation could address some reputational concerns, but it would place a burden on government accounts. Sareb carries roughly 30 billion in debt guaranteed by public funds. In a liquidation scenario, any shortfall would be borne by the national budget. Selling assets at steep discounts risks increasing the financial burden on the state.
h2 Extending the timeline as a feasible option
A second option focuses on adjusting the disbandment timeline. The 2027 horizon should be set no later than two years in advance by Frob and the Ministry of Economy. A straightforward path is to extend Sareb’s operating window, allowing the vehicle and its partners to continue activities for a longer period. Ongoing operations include honoring guarantees on outstanding loans and supervising the sale of assets, which currently account for about 85 percent of activity.
The ultimate choice may hinge on who leads next, whether Nadia Calviño or the head of a future European investment institution, depending on who assumes the role. Although the outcome remains uncertain, extending the deadline would provide greater opportunity to maximize asset returns if market conditions stay favorable; a downturn could push asset values lower.
h2 Distributing remaining assets across communities and councils
A third path would involve distributing Sareb’s remaining assets to various administrative bodies. It would make sense for land parcels to pass to Sepes, the state land agency linked to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Agenda. However, housing units cannot be transferred to Sepes since its remit excludes residential properties; implementation would rest with regional and local governments.
Local and regional authorities could take on portions of Sareb’s portfolio, though some may resist the transfer. Previous arrangements included programs that moved homes to administrations for social renting, with modest compensation. The original target of 15,000 properties was not fully realized, with roughly 2,000 units available. A new option gaining attention is the idea of creating a spin-off—an independent subsidiary that consolidates social housing under public operation in communities lacking local takeover capacity.
Source attribution is drawn from policy briefings and housing policy reports to reflect the evolving discussion about Sareb’s role and future options.