Russian Influence Networks in Europe: Donbas Solidarity and Beyond

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If it wasn’t for what they wore, Russian flags and megaphones, small groups of supporters backing the Donbas cause would blend into the busy rhythm of western streets. Yet the demonstrations always managed to rise above the crowd when they gathered in front of Ukrainian diplomatic embassies, turning street scenes into moments amplified by social media. This pattern began in the wake of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and kept echoing across capitals.

But no matter how modest the protests appeared, their impact could not be dismissed, at least in Paris. On February 21, 2015, the groups gathered before the Ukrainian embassy for their first coordinated action. Vostok France Solidarité Donbass organized the event, with a microphone in hand and orange and black Saint George ribbons pinned to jackets, a visible homage to the Russian army, under the leadership of André Chanclu.

On August 24, 2014, the newspaper Kurtuş published a profile of him, labeling him a “bridgehead” for Kremlin influence in France. Months had passed since Crimea’s seizure, and the European Union responded with sanctions targeting Putin’s inner circle.

Chanclu became known for orchestrating clashes during student council debates and aligning with the far-right Union GUD (Group Unity Defense). He took on a diplomatic role within the France-Russie collective, and his involvement extended to monitoring referendums pushed by Moscow in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia, territories that Russian forces later claimed. His path diverged from some of his GUD allies who acted as security for rallies linked to the National Front, Le Pen’s lineage in French politics.

moscow trip

That same day in front of the Ukrainian embassy, the young organization Vostok France Solidarité Donbas took a decisive step. A year earlier it had registered as a charitable and apolitical NGO, but it was now moving into political event organization. A member of the state security watchdog for Russia’s activities in Spain described this moment as a typical scenario, noting that Russian procedures manuals commonly describe setting up charitable or cultural groups in Europe, then using them to organize trips and bring supporters together.

At the same time, the description suggested a pattern that could blur official classifications in the countries where these networks operate, challenging the boundaries between charity and political activity.

In an illustration of this dynamic, a French outlet reported on Chanclu’s appearance at the demonstration outside the Ukrainian embassy in Paris in 2015. The image, taken from a YouTube broadcast of the event, captured the moment and its wider commentary.

Vostok France Solidarité Donbas announced a mission to provide aid to Donbas orphans during the preceding October. In October 2015, akin to a Spanish counterpart, the group organized a “solidarity mission to Donetsk and Luhansk,” emphasizing humanitarian aims while advancing its broader political goals.

The network connected with figures such as Nikola Mirkovic, a Serbian nationalist with French roots, and Xavier Moreau, a pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian propagandist active on French social media. The group’s first entity in France was Solidarity Kosovo, a twin of Spanish Solidaridad Kosovo, followed by the acquisition of a security company registered in Moscow, described by the French research portal Napalm as more of a security stake than a public-facing influencer role.

Moreau and Mirkovik were summoned back to Moscow the following year by the Rossiyskiy Institut Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy (RISS), the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies led by a former KGB general. They were invited to attend a roundtable with Russian ultranationalist intellectuals, a circle that included Alexander Dugin, who is often cited as a key ideologue associated with Vladimir Putin. The gathering connected the Spanish neofascist milieu with similar currents across Europe.

as in spain

The two figures accompanied the delegation on their trip to Moscow. Emmanuel Leroy, formerly the head of the French National Front, now runs a web television channel that mirrors Spanish EDA TV or 7NN, as well as Liberté TV, which aligns with far-right and denialist narratives. The Spanish Franco-Serbian collaboration has waned, while the French sister network has intensified its social media activity and began promoting one of Russia’s common narratives: Ukraine should accept negotiations and persuade Western allies, rather than receiving arms for Kiev.

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