Russia’s war in Ukraine and the prospect of a second term for Donald Trump in the United States have reshaped the security landscape for the European Union. The risk is pressing, and Brussels is moving with urgency. The first European defense industrial strategy commits 1.5 billion euros for 2025 to 2027 to spur member states to invest more, better, and together, with a clear emphasis on products that are “made in Europe.” The EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, reminds us that Europe faces real threats and cannot take peace for granted. The war is now at Europe’s doorstep, and that reality is driving policy and funding decisions.
During the launch of the initiative, European Commission Vice-President Margrethe Vestager and European Commissioner Thierry Breton explained that the plan reflects a shift in Europe’s security paradigm. The goal is to accelerate production capacity while ensuring investment is structured and European. The strategy sets quantitative targets: by 2030, at least 40 percent of defense equipment should be procured through collaborative European processes, and by the same horizon, at least 50 percent of defense procurement spending should occur within the EU, rising to 60 percent by 2035.
To achieve these aims, the European defense industry program will pool a total of 1.5 billion euros from the European budget for the 2025–2027 period. This funding will combine the Edirpa vehicle, which supports public procurement from EU funds, with the ASAP instrument that boosts defense industry capacity. A Danish commissioner noted that 1.5 billion euros is not a vast sum, but it can act as a lever to attract member state financing. The justification is clear: with a war on Europe’s borders, the moment is ripe for a major investment in defense industry. Vestager underscores that the response is not tied to a particular political moment in the United States but to a shared responsibility for regional security.
Estonia, France, and Poland have echoed calls for greater defense investment in a document cited by Euractiv. They argue that insufficient funding today will lead to higher costs tomorrow. Borrell stresses that EU funds should stimulate capability rather than become a customer for weapons. He notes that Europe does not possess a single centralized Pentagon, but it must coordinate how member states respond to security challenges. Breton adds that the aim is not to buy weapons but to create the conditions for joint work and sustained industrial growth. The Commission estimates that defense spending rose for the eighth consecutive year in 2022, reaching about 240 billion euros among member states, and that a large share of purchases since the Ukraine conflict began has taken place outside the EU, particularly in the United States.
Another pillar of the strategy is joint procurement. Brussels intends to use European funds to encourage governments to engage in joint purchases, similar to the vaccine and gas procurement approaches used during the pandemic. The plan also outlines identifying common projects ready for development by 2035 and strengthening cooperation with Ukraine while inviting Kyiv to participate more directly in Europe’s defense strategy. In this context, Brussels proposes opening a Kyiv office dedicated to defense innovation.
The plan also considers a potential adjustment to the European Investment Bank’s lending policy to support defense project development. It does not, however, revisit the idea raised by the president of the European Commission to use frozen assets from the Russian central bank within the EU to finance Ukraine’s arms purchases. While Borrell supports this concept, he acknowledges that divergences among member states have slowed progress on the reconstruction funding debate for Ukraine. Opinions vary, and the discussion will continue.