Arriaga Asociados filed a complaint against four Supreme Court justices concerning their rulings on the IRPH mortgage index, highlighting potential financial consequences for borrowers. The case concerns actions within the 61st Chamber of the Supreme Court and centers on questions about credibility, truthfulness, and whether statements attributed to coercion or deception could amount to a crime. The law firm argued that the dispute raises serious concerns about how decisions related to IRPH were reached and whether any misconduct or improper influence occurred during the proceedings.
The chamber responsible for reviewing complaints against high court judges chose to register the statement with the public ministry so that authorities could determine if any criminal conduct were present in the way the complaint was presented. The process included examining communications and relations among chamber members and the involved banking institutions, with investigations into possible improper incentives or bribes being considered as part of the reviewing process.
Because the complainants contended there was no factual basis for the charges, the case was framed as an issue of a potential breach of good faith, prompting a separate civil action under Article 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This separate action sought to determine whether the filing of the complaint itself represented an abuse of rights or procedural bad faith, especially given what the filing described as apparent recklessness in presenting the allegations.
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In the record of the case, the court noted that the complaint was dismissed for reasons including the need to invalidate two sentences that relied on the evidentiary sources connected to a banking institution and to annul the declaration that the IRPH index was invalid in certain loan agreements. The reviewing body worked to understand the sequence of events and to assess what actually occurred. The magistrates under scrutiny were believed to have interpreted the statements raised during preliminary questions presented to the Court of Justice of the European Union, and to have addressed objections in ways that could be seen as aligned with the arguments presented at those stages. The court found that the contested judgments contained legal reasoning that could not reasonably be characterized as arbitrary or irrational when viewed against the applicable legal framework. A detailed examination of the objections and arguments led to a conclusion that the decisions had a solid legal basis and were properly reasoned.
The complainant was said to make a contradictory assessment of the issues covered in the judgments. This stance was interpreted as an attempt to challenge the court decisions themselves rather than to pursue a distinct legal wrong. The document notes that the charge of perjury was not straightforwardly supported by objective data and did not demonstrate a clear pattern of collusion among the judges of the First Circuit Court of Appeals or with banking institutions. The argument that new questions raised in the preliminary ruling process indicate any deliberate harmony or collusion among the chamber’s judges did not establish a plausible case of coordinated wrongdoing when assessed in a rational, legal context.
Overall, the analysis by the 61st Chamber suggested that the claims presented did not demonstrate criminal intent or per se criminal conduct. The decisions under review were framed as interpretations of statements made during preliminary inquiries and as responses to objections raised in the course of the proceedings. The chamber emphasized that, after careful consideration of the arguments offered by the complainant, a justified response had been given. While the case rises as a notable dispute over the handling of IRPH related matters, the chamber found no basis to conclude that the judges acted with illegitimate aims beyond reasonable legal interpretation.
In addressing the alleged coercion, the report stated that the complaint lacked objective data or concrete indicators of improper influence. It suggested that the notion of an implicit unity among judges within the First Circuit to favor banking institutions did not withstand scrutiny when evaluated in light of the record. The introduction of new questions in the preliminary ruling did not, on its face, reveal a logical or rational pathway to a finding of collusion among the Supreme Court bench described in the complaint. This assessment contributed to the overall conclusion that the allegations did not establish criminal misconduct within the scope of the proceedings.