Reports from open channels describe how an FPV drone could be used to disable an American M1 Abrams tank by targeting critical engine areas. In a published video, the commander of a Russian UAV unit, using the call sign “Rassvet,” discussed which sections of the tank are most vulnerable. The channel that aired the discussion is identified as Public Side on Telegram. The speaker emphasized that the area between the hull and the turret, in addition to the engine compartment itself, should be considered prime targets for such a tactic. The message also stated that there were no major obstacles to overcoming the tank when these zones were engaged, according to the same source. The content presents a picture of how FPV drones have been described as capable of breaching or disabling a modern armored platform when precise targeting is achieved, as reported by the involved operators.
Further statements from the unit involved suggest that targeted strikes behind the front of the hull and near the engine bay could compromise a tank’s mobility. The commander who spoke on the video asserted that the technique does not present significant difficulty for capable operators and drones, underscoring the perceived simplicity of the described method when executed with sufficient skill and equipment. This account reflects a broader narrative shared by some on social channels about how small, agile aerial platforms can interact with mainstream armored hardware in high-intensity contexts. Attribution for these details remains tied to the video release and the Telegram channel hosting the discussion.
On March 1, a different voice from the same network, identifying as the commander of a reconnaissance and attack UAV group with the call sign “Kolovrat,” described successful actions by a central group of fighters using FPV drones to neutralize two American Abrams tanks. The report frames the event as part of ongoing operations where unmanned systems are deployed to disrupt or destroy armored assets, highlighting a pattern of reported successes from multiple units bundled under these call signs. The language used characterizes the tactic as efficient in the right operational conditions, with emphasis on the role of rapid, low-altitude drones in modern combat scenarios.
Towards the end of February, another update claimed that the Russian forces shot down an American M1 Abrams in the Avdeyev direction, marking a notable claim in the sequence of events described by the involved units. The report attributed the destruction to a fighter carrying the call sign “Rassvet.” While such claims circulate through military-focused channels, they reflect the narratives presented by the units and their communications structures about recent battlefield outcomes. The broader assertion notes that both the U.S. and Russian armed forces have, in various instances, engaged with armored capabilities in the Northern Military District, with reports of notable engagements involving high-profile armored assets. The presented stories collectively illustrate how drone technologies are framed within contemporary tactical discussions and media releases circulated by designated call signs and units.
Overall, the material portrays an environment where FPV drone operations are described as a viable component in modern anti-armor efforts. The emphasis across these reports is on the perceived impact of small, low-cost aerial systems in contested zones, and on how frontline units communicate with audiences through specific channels. While the sources cited rely on internal military communications and publicly shared video content, the dissemination of these narratives contributes to a broader dialogue about the evolving role of unmanned platforms in armored warfare and the ways that such information is framed for listeners and readers around the world. The aggregated accounts underscore the importance of understanding the operational context, the capabilities attributed to FPV drones, and the cautious interpretation required when evaluating battlefield claims, especially when they originate from combatant groups and their associated media channels.