Over the past five years, following the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks, three individuals imprisoned for those crimes showed little public regret. They either denied guilt or offered only a muted acknowledgment of the pain caused, with Driss Oukabir and Mohamed Houli Chemlal among them and Said Ben Iazza already released. This pattern is not unique to a single case; denial and a lack of contrition appear in many European societies, even as prison systems pursue reintegration. For jihadists in custody, false repentance can seem like another form of continuation rather than a genuine break with violent ideology, and there is currently no reliable means to confirm a true renunciation.
These observations are among the preliminary findings expected to be released early in the summer after a European meeting of the Radicalization Awareness Network, held on July 7 and 8. The discussion centers on how to assess and address radicalization within prisons across the continent.
European prison authorities have signaled the limits of current de radicalization programs in custody. Failures are attributed both to insufficient follow up and the difficulty of detecting deceit. Francisco Jose Macero, a Mallorca prison officer and a leading figure in the ACAIP-UGT prison workers association, emphasizes that this is not an exact science. He is the sole active Spanish member of RAN.
go out and try
London has long grappled with the suspicion that repentance may mask continued risk within prison walls. In February 2020, Streatham resident Sudesh Amman, released earlier after a deradicalization course, fatally stabbed two people before he was shot by police. This incident underlines the fear that false repentance can linger undetected.
Macero notes that the concern is shared in France and Belgium. In Spain, the case of the terrorism propagandist Mustafa Maya, who repented in 2018 after involvement with Melilla, is cited as a stark example of how authorities have faced complex cases with high risk profiles.
Experts agree that treatment by RAN should be tailored to the individual. Programs alone seldom suffice. Scientific personalization of intervention is essential, says Macero, but Spanish authorities and social workers generally lack in-depth training about Muslim cultures and the specific contexts of Morocco or Algeria. The goal, he argues, should be the pursuit of life and a gradual shift in focus toward preserving human life rather than clinging to ideology.
MG, a psychologist who has worked in Madrid prisons for 15 years, adds that a frontal confrontation rarely works. Macero agrees, stressing small, achievable milestones. The first step could be to engage the radical in conversation with a woman, illustrating that dialogue itself is possible.
Incentives within prison life are carefully calibrated: the ability to leave the module for recreation, participation in leisure programs, interaction with other inmates, and potential parole opportunities as progress is made. The ultimate aim is for the prisoner to recognize the value of human life and to distance themselves from violence rather than merely abandoning beliefs.
Details to follow
Prisons remain a critical tool in detecting radicals, recruiters, and proselytizers. An internal 2014 directive from the General Secretariat of Penal Institutions outlines observable indicators that can signal evolving radicalization within a prisoner. The guidance, updated after the Catalonia attacks, lists signs such as heightened physical activity, resistance to center rules, seeking higher personal status, and rejection of female staff members.
These indicators form the core of Prison Control and Monitoring Groups, the units charged with tracking radicalization and preventing prisons from becoming hubs of jihadist influence. They also serve to deter other crimes like theft or drug trafficking that can be linked to extremist networks inside prisons.
Observation remains relevant even when prisoners do not openly display signs of devotion. A skilled recruiter may hide the more visible markers while still guiding others toward extremism, notes Macero.
The institutional norm assigns duties across guards, librarians, educators, social workers, and medical staff. Yet some personnel report uncertainty about who to report concerns to, highlighting gaps in training and awareness about how radicalization evolves inside detention facilities.
Spain currently lacks a single unifying leadership body for fanatical Islamists in prison while attempting to form a cohesive front. A past operation known as Escribano sought to centralize control, but did not meet its long term aims. In the medium term, experts warn that school-related violence linked to radicalization could emerge as a principal security concern in prisons, alongside mental health issues and other internal crimes.
Today the number of extremists within Spain’s prison population is relatively small. Out of roughly sixty thousand inmates, about 250 have known jihadist links, with many serving as promoters or collaborators rather than being the direct perpetrators of major attacks. The attackers in Barcelona and Madrid were not typically captured alive, underscoring the pressures and risks involved in counterterrorism work.