Vilnius is not poised to host another NATO summit any time soon. The first gathering will be led by General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg following the extension of his mandate, and the evolution of the alliance’s principles carries heavy implications. Madrid could host a summit driven by new strategic needs, intensified by the war in Ukraine.
From conversations with the 31 NATO members, five items stand out for their urgency or significance.
founding of sweden
This remains the most pressing political debate. There is no precedent for a frozen, single‑trust situation where allies veto key steps and that veto becomes a decisive factor.
Sweden’s entry awaits final consent. Hungary, with Türkiye as the main hurdle, presents a stubborn obstacle. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrives in Vilnius with a stance not far from his initial position. Blocking Sweden’s accession sits at the center of the dispute as the Atlantic Alliance awaits the Madrid summit; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine adds urgency to every decision.
The alliance’s eastward expansion continues as long as Sweden maintains its stance. Ankara’s asylum policy and public sentiment connected to Islamophobia fuel Turkish anger toward Sweden’s far right, but deeper strategic questions persist beyond the current controversy.
Sweden hosts not only PKK members but also YPG forces while engaging in battles against ISIS in northern Syria. Erdogan could aim to leverage the Vilnius summit to press for a more favorable outcome while tensions remain high but not irremediable.
Among Stoltenberg’s preparations for Vilnius, the most intensive efforts involve bilateral talks between Swedish and Turkish officials. Even on Monday, a meeting between Erdogan and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson yielded progress toward a plenary agreement for the summit.
Relations with Ukraine
If Ukraine were a NATO member, the crisis would likely have escalated into a broader global conflict on February 24, 2022, with Kyiv activating Article 5. Today, Ukraine cannot join the Alliance, a structure conceived at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, and deploying Western personnel to Donbas or Zaporizhzhia fronts before Russia’s moves would remain impractical.
Over the past year, Ukraine has benefited from NATO perspectives, doctrine, communications, intelligence, and weaponry thanks to substantial Western support and guidance in the face of Russian aggression, even if some equipment remains inadequate. Ukraine receives a wide stream of Western guidance and materiel, strengthening its defensive posture.
This reality is addressed through a NATO‑Ukraine Council, a political precursor awaiting Vilnius approval. Similar to past Cold War moments, there is a counterpart arrangement under discussion, akin to the former NATO–Russia Council that once governed coordination. The Alliance is pursuing an ongoing NATO‑Ukraine Council framework.
Three weeks earlier, allies reviewed the organization’s activities at ministerial levels, including the NATO‑Ukraine Commission established in 1997. In that forum, Ukraine participates on equal terms, engaging in the political framework and receiving moderately classified documents. It mirrors earlier NATO patterns with Russia, which grew from tensions around Crimea in 2014 and the so‑called little green men.
Russia gained access to documents and trained alongside Western forces in various joint exercises years ago, including the 2011 Bold Monarch naval drill. Russian divers trained near Spanish waters with NATO partners, illustrating the entwined security dynamics of that era.
Powered by DDA: more teeth to show
There is a push for more troops along eastern borders, stronger air defenses, heavier artillery, and additional armored units. Eastern allies demand clearer deterrence commitments. The Madrid Summit’s Strategic Concept reinforced the language of threat and deterrence in light of Russia’s actions since 2022.
A senior official notes that Madrid defined the direction, while Vilnius is expected to translate doctrine into concrete military plans. Eastern allies, especially Poland and the Baltic states, seek explicit wording on the composition and readiness of forces, moving beyond broad concepts to tangible measures. The Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Region (DDA) framework is frequently cited in those discussions.
In March 2022, NATO deployed armored formations and air policing missions from the United States to the Baltic states and to battalion‑sized contingents in Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The aim now is to scale up: the ability to react within five days, expanding from battalion to brigade formations.
Vilnius is expected to push readiness and response capacities of forces, shaping a coherent stance for Spain and other allies to maintain unity and readiness across ongoing operations. The plan includes stockpiling, ready‑to‑move ammunition, and rapid movement across the alliance’s lines of operation.
The forecast identifies five critical categories: food, spare parts and equipment, fuel, reinforcement elements, and ammunition. In other words, a comprehensive logistical matrix that underscores the scale of planning required.
Allied negotiations hinge on logistics, which is inherently complex and costly. A senior official notes that while the process is arduous, it is essential for coordinated action and resource sharing across partners, even if it means relinquishing some control over the use of resources.
New command structure
Allocation aims at deterring Russia. A Force Building Conference will follow political decisions as chiefs of staff settle duties and responsibilities.
The effort will define a unified joint statement of needs, the CJSOR, detailing personnel, equipment, and capital requirements. The new command architecture will influence calculations and force readiness. The United States seeks a more agile NATO, with quicker access to military advice and streamlined information processing.
The American military leadership pushes for faster decision cycles, advancing the NATO Crisis Response System to shorten timelines. Some European members prefer more formal meetings of the North Atlantic Council before operational plans are activated. In Vilnius, discussions may touch on shifts in authority if a crisis escalates, including Russia’s missile incursions on Polish soil in November and the rapid political responses that followed.
A photo caption notes Stoltenberg with Erdogan at Madrid in 2022, illustrating the ongoing personal diplomacy behind these institutional moves. Vilnius could finalize a new command structure ready by July 2024, though Ankara remains wary about hosting a NATO military presence on Turkish soil without its own headquarters there.
More infrastructure to defend
NATO’s eastward expansion shows more on paper than on the ground. While Russia is viewed as a less reliable ally, the alliance is pushing ahead with infrastructure development in the east. The Madrid Infrastructure Improvement Program and Vilnius plans emphasize better eastward distribution, expanded airports, deeper ports, and longer oil pipelines to sustain operations across borders.
Spain’s Rotodar line, a key military logistics artery, illustrates the broader need for a connected energy and transport backbone. There is still no direct pipeline linking the Dutch coast to Romania, underscoring the vulnerability of supply chains across the alliance. An uninterrupted flow of fuel across Europe remains vital, especially after the war’s early disruptions.