Sanctions are like a slow-acting poison. They begin to show effects only after some time, but once they take hold they can be lasting and irreversible, summed up recently by the EU’s top foreign policy official as the nine-pack of measures against Russia continues to bite. The tenth package is being prepared, and EU governments had already approved the prior set last year. The aim is to tighten the Kremlin’s economy while keeping pressure on its war machine and Ukraine’s defense. The overall impact may unfold gradually, yet the strategy remains decisive and focused on a long-term outcome rather than an immediate fix.
Among those targeted are 1,386 individuals including Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, the political leadership around Moscow, propagandists, and numerous oligarchs and businessmen who back the Kremlin. In addition, 171 entities face individual sanctions. The EU has also restricted the export of a wide range of goods to Russia, cutting off access to technologies from quantum computing to semiconductors and advanced electronics. Civil and military dual-use goods and technologies, such as oil refining equipment, aircraft engines, spare parts for aircraft and helicopters, jet fuel, and radio communications gear, along with unmanned aerial vehicle software, are among the items prohibited for sale to Moscow. In short, assets that could be used to strengthen Russia’s war effort are increasingly hard to obtain.
Russia’s exports to the EU have been blocked on several fronts, including crude oil since December and refined products since February, as well as coal, iron and steel products, gold, cement, wood, paper and certain luxury goods. There is also a cap on the price of Russian crude and its derivatives transported by sea, designed to push buyers to comply with the price limit and to discourage risky financing for these shipments.
The enforcement reach extends into road transport, aviation, maritime, and financial sectors. Russian banks have been excluded from the Swift system, and transactions with the Bank of Russia and Belarus are restricted. European firms also scale back services to Moscow, including consulting, legal advice, engineering, and accounting. Despite the tightening of the market and predictions that many firms will exit Russia, some continue to operate, as cited in a recent systematic assessment.
Moscow pulls the blow
Months ago, the international consensus held that the sanctions would trigger a swift collapse of the Russian economy. Yet expectations evolved. The IMF and OECD projections show a shrinking economy in the near term but with a possible rebound features in the mid-term. The most recent analyses anticipated a modest recovery later on, even amid ongoing pressures.
Budget numbers from early 2023 raised alarms about the pace of spending, with deficits growing and revenues slipping compared with the previous year. Analysts urged caution, noting that a single monthly snapshot does not determine the entire economic trajectory. Still, a keener picture emerged of a more fragile fiscal situation than before the conflict began.
The year of sanctions also highlighted Russia’s hydrocarbon sector. Despite Europe’s push for energy independence, Moscow benefited from resilient demand and price dynamics at the outset of the war. Some official estimates suggested a robust share of earnings from coal, gas, and oil exports during the first stretch of the conflict, with a substantial portion directed toward European buyers before diversification intensified.
As the bloc moved to diversify supply and impose price caps, the Russian government faced new selling pressures. Analysts observed that higher discounts to non-European markets emerged as Moscow sought alternative buyers. This shift altered traditional flows and raised questions about the duration and depth of the economic strain. The leadership in Brussels has estimated daily revenue losses tied to the oil cap, while observers noted a new balance of power in the global energy market.
By January 2023, the overall income picture for Russia had been notably affected, with a marked drop in certain revenue streams and a widening public deficit. Some experts argued that the sanctions, though painful, were not enough to trigger an immediate collapse, especially given Russia’s fiscal and resource strengths. They cautioned that the ultimate impact would hinge on how firmly European export controls are maintained and how Moscow adapts to the evolving price and demand landscape. A prominent analyst highlighted that sanctions tend to work in gradual, cumulative waves rather than in a single moment of downfall. The broader discussion continues around the long-term strategic effects on the Kremlin’s plans and how sanctions reshape the global balance of power.