The sun replaced the rain as the Kosovo prime minister drove a taxi through Madrid’s Paseo del Prado, attending a secret meeting with his former NATO secretary general, Javier Solana. The socialist leadership that helped separate Kosovo from Serbia and the same forces that ordered strikes on Belgrade to stop the suffering remained inside the Prado Museum. En route, the 47-year-old Balkan leader noted light filtering through Velázquez’s trees, a site designated World Heritage by Unesco. At the march’s end, he learned that the City Council had draped Cybeles with Ukrainian flags. “I’ve just arrived; I hadn’t seen that yet,” he said. The discussion touched on Putin’s troubled path, with a light mockery that suggested the Russian leader would eventually lose the war and that Kosovo would help others survive the outcome. It was Kurti’s first visit to Spain, a country whose government does not recognize Kosovo. He traveled to Madrid for the Socialist International congress this weekend and happened to greet Pedro Sánchez, whose party shares a common political lineage with Kurti’s Self-Determination Movement in Kosovo. That movement rose from student activism and a push for independence and European integration, facing opposition from conservatives and a sluggish administration, while a large diaspora funded Kosovo’s political and social projects from abroad. In Madrid, Kosovo’s leader described his party’s international outreach, noting visits to Geneva, Tel Aviv, Ramallah and Brussels, and expressing that coming to Spain has always fascinated him. He also spoke briefly with Sánchez during a European socialists gathering in Berlin, noting cordial relations with Portugal’s Antonio Costa and describing a positive regional dynamic.
– The interviewee suggests that in Albin Kurti’s vision, independence and social justice are deeply linked. Is the stance nationalist or social democratic?
– He identifies as a European social democrat who wants Kosovo to become stronger. Self-determination is framed as a liberating right, not a tool for domination, and the aspiration is to achieve independence from oppression rather than supremacy. The aim is to lift Kosovo from poverty and ensure a fair future within a democratic framework.
– Why does Spain not recognize Kosovo?
– He expresses regret that Spain is among the EU and NATO members that do not recognize Kosovo. He notes that a small number of NATO countries—four—don’t recognize Kosovo, with Spain being the largest non-recognizer in the EU. He attributes the hesitation to a lack of information about Kosovo’s situation and critiques a Spanish politician who compared Kosovo’s status with Spain’s own concerns.
– What does that mean in practice?
– The concern is that recognizing Kosovo could set a precedent for other secessionist movements. He invokes Albanian writer Ismail Kadare and recalls the Prince of Asturias award’s reflections on NATO’s 1999 intervention to stop mass atrocities. He argues that analogies with Catalonia should not overshadow Kosovo’s distinct history, noting the violence against civilians in 1999 and the legal findings of the Hague Tribunal. Kosovo’s pursuit of self-determination is framed as anti-colonial and rooted in the desire for equality rather than regional dominance.
– Does Catalonia mirror Kosovo’s path?
– He believes Catalonia’s case should be resolved through negotiation between Madrid and Barcelona, not through outside summaries. In his view, Spain’s democratic framework should handle secession debates through dialogue within the European Union.
– Is the Catalan issue more about perception than policy?
– The discussion emphasizes that the Kosovo movement seeks a bottom-up, democratic form of self-determination rather than an imposed, external solution. It references Crimea as a contrast, arguing that unilateral moves deprived people of a genuine democratic process. Kosovo’s experience is presented as a human rights struggle grounded in solidarity with the less advantaged.
– Is Kosovo’s independence connected to broader regional dynamics?
– The interviewee notes that state violence can sometimes be framed as liberation, and suggests that differences within the European Union should resemble the Czech-Slovak split model. He acknowledges limited familiarity with Catalonia but envisions negotiations as the path to resolution.
– What about the Catalan question again?
– He refrains from commenting deeply, insisting that any resolution should come through dialogue and EU involvement. He adds that Kosovo is ready to discuss with anyone who can help Spain recognize Kosovo, stressing that recognition is pivotal for Kosovo’s entry into the EU and NATO. He mentions a sincere but non-committal exchange with Sánchez and notes Kosovo’s aim to join the Council of Europe and NATO. Kosovo’s government has increased military spending and participated in multinational exercises to strengthen regional security.
– What about Kosovo and Albania’s relationship?
– He points out that Kosovo and Albania share language and cultural roots, envisioning closer ties and alignment within NATO. The two states face security concerns shaped by Serbia’s influence and its partnerships with Russia.
– How are Kosovo Serbs in the north and cross-border tensions addressed?
– The interview touches on license plate disputes and calls for a real bilateral deal with Serbia to resolve outstanding issues. He suggests that regional diplomacy should move beyond technicalities to a substantive political solution.
– How much does Russia affect the Balkans today?
– The discussion references Sputnik’s Balkan bureau in Belgrade and Russia’s networks in Nis, framing them as attempts to influence the region. The interview notes that Western interventions have had mixed results, while Kosovo’s ongoing reforms have moved it up in Transparency International’s rankings. The possibility of international tribunals extending accountability beyond Milosevic is raised as a question for future justice.