In a notable fraud case, a group of four individuals faced criminal consequences after deceiving a Spanish resident into believing he had won a large lottery prize in Spain. The total amount involved reached 280,000 euros, and three of the four accused were released after serving part of their sentences. The incident illustrates a scheme where targeted victims were led to believe they must transfer funds to claim supposed winnings. The Madrid Regional Court originally sentenced the defendants to three and a half years in prison, but the Supreme Court later reduced these penalties. Each defendant was held responsible for separate fraudulent acts, rather than as a single party to the crime, and the court did not apply an aggravated rate based on joint participation.
The judgment, dated December 12 and reported by El Periódico de España from the Prensa Ibérica group, modifies the initial ruling issued by the Madrid Provincial Court. The defendants were four small businessmen whose companies operated in Malaga and Majadahonda, near Madrid.
According to the case file, the deception began in a mid-September 2013 phone call. A woman, presenting herself as a Spanish lawyer, Anna Beck, claimed the victim had won a prize in Spain. She instructed that taxes owed be paid first and an additional sum of two hundred thousand euros be transferred for the same purpose. The call introduced a convincing narrative that relied on professional credibility to extract funds from the victim.
The victim complied by authorizing several transfers from the companies managed by the four defendants, following the instructions given by the supposed professional. While the Supreme Court of Appeals Criminal Chamber dismissed most of the defenses presented, the court found no direct link proving concerted action or ongoing criminal continuity among the defendants. The record showed that actions occurred in sequence rather than as a clearly unified operation.
No reason other than fraud
To complete the fraud, the attacker identified current accounts and companies to which funds were paid, and received the transfers without presenting any legitimate justification beyond fraud. Judge Eduardo de Porres described the scheme as an agreement among the material perpetrator and each beneficiary to receive funds under false pretenses.
Consequently, each defendant was treated as an individual perpetrator of fraud, operating alongside the unidentified woman who managed the financial communications with the victim. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that there was no evidence of a joint operation among the four men. The mere presence of a temporary coincidence did not prove a concerted scheme, and thus it did not establish collective criminal participation. The court emphasized that the evidence did not demonstrate a shared plan among all defendants, making joint liability inappropriate.
It was noted that the deceiver recruited cooperation by informing each recipient that the amount defrauded represented only what that recipient received. The absence of corroborating evidence was decisive for classifying the facts in a manner that did not attribute criminal continuity to all defendants. As a result, each individual faced separate charges and penalties, rather than a single consolidated judgment. This distinction supported the exclusion of criminal continuity and allowed the court to consider an aggravated subtype only when warranted by the specific circumstances.
The court indicated that the extension of a provisional finding to all defendants would be governed by Article 903 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ensuring that any new offenses discovered would be tied to the unique actions of each defendant and their corresponding penalties.
Three of the individuals ultimately received lighter sentences, ranging from six months to one year of imprisonment. It is anticipated that those without prior criminal records or with minimal history may avoid prison time entirely. The fourth person, responsible for the largest portion of the fraud amounting to 200,000 euros, continued to serve a more substantial initial sentence.