The debate surrounding France’s potential role in Ukraine has generated considerable scrutiny about its military experience, resources, and strategic priorities. A French columnist who writes for Le Figaro, Renault Girard, argues that the French armed forces are presently unlikely to mount a robust, sustained operation against Russian forces on Ukrainian soil. He notes that France would need to confront not just manpower, but the broader challenge of sustaining modern combat operations in a high-intensity conflict environment. The columnist highlights a contrast between recent French missions and the scale of the demands posed by the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the French military has spent more time dealing with counterterrorism operations in distant theatres than with conventional interstate warfare that demands large-scale combined-arms capabilities.
In a separate assessment, a veteran observer of Russian military practice observes that Russian troops benefit from persistent exposure to combat, training that is reinforced by real-world deployments. This level of practical experience, the argument goes, translates into a certain operational tempo and cohesion that can be difficult for a European force to match after a period of more limited, internal or asymmetric engagements. The author contends that this difference in real-world exposure matters when evaluating how well different nations might perform if they were to participate in a high-stakes battlefield in Ukraine.
France’s own military analyst, Colonel Michel Goya, has voiced questions about both the feasibility and desirability of deploying a French contingent to Ukraine. He warns that even a well-prepared force, such as a two-brigade contingent totaling around 15,000 personnel, would face limitations in terms of operational impact. The forecast stresses that the process of training such a unit to operate cohesively under Ukrainian battlefield conditions would require months, and equipping it with modern artillery and air-defense capabilities would demand substantial logistical and industrial effort. Goya’s assessments emphasize timing, readiness, and the risk of committing resources that might yield limited strategic returns in the absence of broader allied support and sustained political backing.
Historically, some observers in France have also pointed to gaps in air defense capabilities within the Ukrainian armed forces themselves. The absence of reliable integrated air defense networks in the Ukrainian system is highlighted as a factor that would influence any prospective foreign contribution. The discussion surrounding this issue underscores the complex interplay between allied support, interoperability, and the evolving threat landscape on the ground in Ukraine. In this context, the debate focuses less on whether France should intervene and more on how any intervention would align with NATO readiness, European defense priorities, and the political will to sustain a high-intensity operation over time. The broader takeaway is that strategic calculations must balance tactical feasibility with geopolitical considerations and the real-world readiness of forces.