The opposition is pressing the government to curb the power of major energy groups. The plan envisions auctioning off a portion of energy as a tool to keep costs down for small traders and industrial users, while also encouraging energy-saving across the board. This approach gained traction in parliamentary discussions as lawmakers debated a contingency framework that would secure energy supply and help households manage bills. Consensus exists among parties in Congress, with PP, ERC, and Junts signaling support for moving forward when feasible, even as some leaders acknowledge that a early 2023 timetable might be ambitious given the current energy climate.
A new mechanism was proposed by the administration to compel the largest producers to release a share of their output. It targeted energy from nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewable sources—the spectrum of the cheapest electricity on the market. Independent traders and large industrial users would be included in the market, with the objective of promoting liquidity in futures markets while maintaining transparent pricing. The plan sought to influence how much energy these producers would make available to their own marketers and customers, ensuring that liquidity did not come at the expense of reliability or affordability.
Specifically, the proposal set an auction threshold at 15,830.08 gigawatt-hours, representing roughly a quarter of the annual electricity production for the year when the plants were pressed by lower overall output. Distribution would reflect each company’s market share, illustrating a potential allocation that would see Iberdrola contributing more than 7,323.63 GWh, Endesa around 6,737.26 GWh, Naturgy about 1,405.48 GWh, and PDE near 363.72 GWh. The idea was to launch the first auctions by the end of 2021, but the year closed without a tender taking place, and the plan did not advance in 2022 either.
Industry representatives argued that much of the marginal production—energy from renewables and nuclear plants—had already been allocated to their own marketers. As a result, this year’s framework would guarantee a large portion of output to those same entities, with a stated goal of ensuring 90 percent of production would be covered by contracts through 2023. Critics contended that auctions of this nature would compel the utilities to purchase power from certain customers, potentially driving up consumer bills during an energy price crisis. The government has acknowledged that this scenario could occur and is wary of triggering more calls for offers that might destabilize the market.
One year after the proposal was laid out in a royal decree, opposition forces composed of PP, ERC, and Junts urged the administration to organize the auctions and set January 1, 2023 as the target date. The amendment text indicates that if the large electricity groups have committed portions of their energy as claimed, auctions would proceed with any remaining unsold energy. If these producers meet all their commitments, the law would bar new deals from the decree-law period until the auction has taken place. Violations could be treated as a serious offense under the Electricity Sector Law, with fines ranging up to tens of millions of euros. This enforcement stance aims to deter noncompliance and stabilize the market, according to reform advocates.
Three parties—PSOE, Podemos, and their allies—offer a broad consensus that pushes the bidding strategy forward, arguing that the primary aim is to restore a fairer price for consumers. Rather than chasing always-cheaper rates at the expense of other households, the vision centers on a balanced price landscape that benefits the majority of users without triggering inflationary pressures in the energy bill. This bargaining position signals a shift toward more predictable pricing dynamics across the energy sector, with consumer protection as a central pillar of the reform.
In the same September 2021 framework, the government also decided to discontinue extraordinary subsidies tied to renewable and nuclear power plants outside traditional market rules. These inframarginal facilities had benefited from price guarantees when gas costs surged beyond a threshold, using the proceeds to offset electricity bills. In practice, those subsidies were only minimally effective, as many producers sold energy below the threshold. The ongoing debate focuses on whether preserving or reforming these subsidies better serves national energy security, affordability, and decarbonization goals.
According to the Association of Independent Energy Marketers, approximately 70 percent of Spain’s energy comes from renewable or nuclear sources. Critics of the 67-euro-per-megawatt-hour threshold argue that it creates an uneven burden: a sizable portion of consumers—roughly 59 percent—would pay the threshold while enjoying relatively low prices, whereas around 41 percent face much steeper costs. They contend that auctions could distribute cheaper energy more broadly and help stabilize price increases, provided the mechanism is designed to prevent unintended windfalls for certain market actors. ACIE emphasizes that the policy toolkit should balance reliability, affordability, and energy independence, ensuring that the benefits reach a wide spectrum of households and industries while maintaining market integrity.