An expert, Ángel Sanz Cubero, a signaling technician, asserted that the high-speed change at the A Grandeira bend, the site of the 2013 Alvia derailment, would not undermine the safety measures planned to be removed from the project. He pointed to the final kilometers of the line and the ERTMS system as central elements for controlling speed and protecting the stretch.
In testimony before the prosecutor’s office, he used a vivid analogy to illustrate the risk: drivers are told a problem has been detected and reported. There is a cliff, a wire, and an iron rod, and the plan is to balance them day after day until everything collapses. He argued that there are no safety nets beneath, which is unacceptable.
These remarks come amid ongoing civil liability proceedings that began nearly a decade after the Angrois accident, which claimed 80 lives and left more than 140 injured in the Compostela district. In the current session, before the civil liability portion proceeds, he described the signaling work carried out at the request of the attorney defending Francisco Garzón, the driver on the day of the crash.
Garzón, along with Andrés Cortabitarte, Adif’s former safety chief, faces trial for serious professional recklessness. The charges focus on late braking and entering a curve at excessive speed, followed by criticisms of how risks were evaluated and mitigated.
From 200 kilometers per hour to 80 kilometers per hour
For Grandeira, the expert identified the most critical issue on the Ourense to Santiago line as the need to slow speeds from 200 km/h to 80 km/h. He stressed that the published maximum speed chart does not reflect real conditions, noting that the ERTMS covers only a single kilometer of the bend in question. He asserted that the line could run safely at high speeds only when protected by ERTMS controls.
He explained that he could not accept leaving the bend unprotected for safety reasons. Documents and the high-speed nature of the line compelled him to demand proper safeguards. His concern was that the line might need adjustments before the end of the route to protect travelers.
He described how, when traffic on the railway exceeds 160 km/h, operators introduce conditional signals that flash a green light and order a brake. He noted that this approach signals forthcoming information but also includes other measures, such as pre-announcements and auto-release blocks, which help manage the network more predictably. The result is a more evenly staggered network.
We wouldn’t be in this room today
The expert highlighted uneven placement of earlier signals along the line. He suggested indicating a speed restriction of 160 km/h rather than 200 km/h, arguing that if the line were properly marked, the tragedy could have been prevented. He noted that Adif uses the Angrois incident to justify a more permissive speed allowance on other sections of the network.
During cross-examination, he described a poorly positioned billboard near the cabin tour area and questioned whether it was technically ideal for protecting a high-speed train. He also pointed to a preexisting signal to drop from 110 to 105 km/h as an example of earlier signaling decisions that could have influenced outcomes on the day of the accident.
I am saying it very clearly in case someone from Adif listens to me
The session paused briefly due to computer issues. When it resumed, Sanz Cubero warned that a non-existent signal remained on the track and should not be ignored. He reiterated that this signal did not meet regulatory standards and questioned why it remained active on the line. He spoke directly to the former senior Adif representative and to the state attorneys present, underscoring the need for clear updates to speed controls on the day of the crash.
The maximum speed change indicator, which lacked useful guidance for drivers on the day of the accident, was criticized as outdated and not aligned with current regulations. He argued that continuing to rely on it would be pointless and stressed that it should be removed if it no longer serves a safety purpose.
He added that Adif had parallels with Angrois in necessary speed monitoring, suggesting that the network should not permit speed jumps that could endanger trains. He described this practice as not credible and warned against turning a technical judgment into a broad policy without solid data to support it.
He offered an analogy about purchasing power: when it drops, winners may fail to eat, underscoring the idea that speed management decisions affect more people than just the operators. He framed the speed reduction values as a possible mechanism for disengaging from risk rather than a genuine safety measure.
Given the ongoing lawsuit against the former police chief, he warned that the numeric speed reductions might be misinterpreted as a deliberate tactic to distance the company from accountability. He spoke plainly to ensure the issue was not obscured by jargon.
Security has deteriorated
Earlier, he stressed that because these signs carry essentially infinite validity, it would be feasible to impose a temporary speed limit near the accident site if necessary. He also mentioned withdrawing the enhanced green light signal as an alternative, arguing this would be a meaningful safety improvement.
A Grandeira, he concluded, clearly worsened security conditions for Puertollano when comparing the two locations. In closing, he criticized the practice of delivering an incomplete line for training, calling it a serious irregularity. If the opening must be postponed, he said, an unfinished line should not be used for training, which he found untidy.
There are no rules, there is common sense
During the noon session, the prosecutor questioned whether the suggested speed changes for the section complied with norms. The expert replied that in the absence of formal rules, common sense must guide decisions. He indicated there is a need for practical safeguards and honest assessment rather than rigid adherence to outdated standards.