Beijing has long used port control as a tool of influence, and the pace of this approach is accelerating as it is put into practice. Asian capital investments are expanding their footprint worldwide, and the effects are visible on the African continent, a point previously analyzed by Faro de Vigo of the Prensa Ibérica group. In Europe, Chinese firms have taken part in container terminals in Barcelona, Bilbao, and Valencia. From 2004 to 2021, the People’s Republic under Xi Jinping invested more than 9.1 billion in infrastructure near coastal areas. This significant commitment stands in stark contrast to the lack of foreign commitments on its own soil. The takeaway is straightforward: there is a risk of surrendering strategic regions to foreign interests, a concern that adds tension for Brussels.
Among the voices that sounded the alarm, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) reported to the Ursula von der Leyen Commission. This advisory body of the Twenty-Seven, comprising representatives from workers’ and employers’ organizations and other stakeholder groups, published an opinion on Europe’s maritime security strategy. It highlighted concerns about Europe’s current dependence on a powerful eastern actor and the way Chinese activities have expanded into ports across several European nations. The document sent to the European Commission argues that the Union’s influence over critical infrastructures must be safeguarded and supports Strasbourg’s call for a roadmap to address this issue. It notes risks related to China owning European ports, such as the potential disruption of goods flows between ports and the risk of unauthorized access to confidential information, particularly as supply chains consolidate in light of lessons learned from the pandemic when major industry and food lines suffered dramatic disruptions.
Europe faces food sovereignty challenges as fishing policies in Brussels tighten. Much of the fish relied upon comes from Beijing, including large imports recorded in 2022, and there is a broader worry about losing logistics sovereignty if major Chinese operators such as Cosco, CMG, or China Communications Construction acquire strategic facilities in the bloc. Similar patterns have appeared in Africa, with implications for nations like Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Namibia, Djibouti, and Madagascar.
The EESC argues that Europe’s maritime security strategy must stay competitive by maintaining a strong strategic presence, protecting legal maritime trade, and ensuring free maritime movement. It asserts that a robust European posture in maritime security requires increased investment by member states and a clear commitment to deploying their maritime capabilities.
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Beyond these assessments, the opinion sent to the Commission, at a meeting convened by the Court of Justice of the European Union yesterday, calls for the immediate development of a centralized EU surveillance center. This center would serve both civilian and military needs and would enable the integration and coordination of existing information technology platforms to facilitate information exchange within Europe’s maritime sector. It also emphasizes addressing cyber security threats as a priority within the International Maritime Organization. It stresses the importance of providing seafarers with professional retraining to familiarize them with automated systems and emerging technologies, ensuring they gain the skills needed to counter cyber threats.
The EESC also expresses concern that some member states with close ties to China are vetoing or diluting the EU’s latest statements on China’s actions in the South China Sea. The document, approved with strong support, calls for a coordinated naval presence in the region to promote stability and to demonstrate the Union’s commitment to freedom of navigation. It suggests that the Union should prioritize its security and economic well-being while advancing its maritime policy.