Andrei Zhdanov was an emblematic figure of the early Soviet era who lived through the upheavals of the Revolution. In 1915, at nineteen, he joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) and held lower roles during the revolutionary events of 1917. In the 1930s, Zhdanov advanced to the Central Committee, becoming a key ideologue of Stalinism. He personally approved execution lists during the Great Terror and played a major role in organizing the defense of besieged Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War, effectively becoming the country’s second most influential official after Stalin.
In this capacity, the former Bolshevik earned a reputation as a staunch opponent of Russian cultural figures, promoting socialist realism. The report you see characterizes Anna Akhmatova as “an angry woman running between the bedroom and the chapel,” describing her inner world as a blend of dying despair, mystical experiences, and erotic undertones. The same document labels Mikhail Zoshchenko as “literary scum,” and it also criticizes Dmitry Merezhkovsky, Fyodor Sologub, and others.
By the age of fifty, Zhdanov faced serious heart problems and, in the summer of 1948, sought treatment at the Valdai sanatorium operated by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. Distinguished Soviet physicians, including Pyotr Egorov, Vladimir Vinogradov, and Vladimir Vasilenko, attempted to manage his pain and shortness of breath. Lydia Timashuk, who led the Department of Functional Diagnostics at the Kremlin clinic, was summoned to Valdai for a rest and conducted Zhdanov’s cardiogram during the next examination on August 28. Her interpretation suggested a myocardial infarction requiring strict bed rest. Yet Vinogradov and Vasilenko, more experienced clinicians, disagreed, arguing that the episode reflected ischemia worsening rather than a heart attack, and advised continued sanatorium activity. On August 31, Zhdanov died from a heart stroke.
The Trial of the Doctors
Cardiology experts found themselves unable to persuade Timashuk, who proceeded to inform higher authorities. First, she sent a note to the USSR Ministry of State Security tied to Lechsanupr, the Kremlin Hospital authority, asserting that Zhdanov was treated improperly. The security service, lacking medical expertise, forwarded the complaint to the head of Lechsanupra, Egorov, who remained in his position for a time before being reassigned to a lesser role in the clinic.
The matter faded for several years until the so-called Conspiracy of Doctors emerged. It is noted that the MGB notified Stalin about Timashuk’s complaints immediately after Zhdanov’s death. Stalin reviewed the note and kept it in the archive without acting on it. In August 1952, the cardiologist was summoned by the MGB to recount the events surrounding Zhdanov’s death.
Security agencies were then investigating what they termed the largest anti-Soviet plot of doctors, a self-made theory that began to take shape on June 2, 1951, when investigator Dmitry Ryumin claimed to Stalin that a recently interrogated Jewish nationalist and cardiologist, Yakov Etinger, had killed a Politburo member. Alexander Shcherbakov accused others of sabotaging treatment methods. These claims were not even reflected in the official protocol, which only mentioned anti-Soviet agitation. Nevertheless, Stalin directed his officials to expose perceived American agents among doctors, and Timashuk’s past notes were brought into the case.
Soon Egorov, Vinogradov, Vasilenko, and many others were arrested, and by late autumn 1952 Stalin was informed of alleged confessions from doctors about shortening the lives of party leaders. Confessions appeared unsurprising to some, given that Stalin had ordered torture and harsh measures during that era. In January 1953, TASS announced the arrest of nine doctors, a number that grew and stirred debate among contemporaries and historians about a renewed wave of repression. Timashuk was celebrated by some outlets for exposing a supposed conspiracy, yet the celebration proved temporary as political tides shifted.
After Stalin’s death in March, the “Doctors’ Case” and related repression subsided, and Timashuk gradually faded from favor. By 1956, at the twentieth party congress, Khrushchev referenced Timashuk as a participant in the repressive campaign, and his name came to symbolize the era’s excesses among former colleagues, who were said to feel betrayed.
Victim, not informant
It is instructive to consider whether Zhdanov’s treatment was truly mismanaged, whether under foreign influence or by error. A modern interpretation by cardiologists suggests that Timashuk’s assessment did not capture the full medical history needed to diagnose a heart attack. The ultimate judgment requires a review of the entire clinical record. Even a flawed analysis by Timashuk does not automatically cast him as an informant in the classic sense of handing colleagues over to state security. He cannot be simply blamed for society’s ills.
Despite deep-seated enmity, Zhdanov remained employed at the Kremlin clinic until his retirement in 1964. During Khrushchev’s era, he did not champion a public defense of his reputation, but after Brezhnev assumed power, he began writing to high offices, insisting that he had never accused his colleagues of sabotage and asserting that he himself had been the victim of an unjust Doctors’ Case. He argued that his own involvement was limited and that the medical service acted without his consent.
In a note from the summer of 1952, a colleague recalls being summoned to discuss the case with investigators and later receiving a high honor, an Order of Lenin. He claimed that he did not deserve such a distinction, arguing that his medical work did not merit it. Accounts from Timashuk’s associates indicate that he respected medical knowledge, and in private conversations he often defended Zhdanov’s diagnostic outcome. The complaints to security authorities likely stemmed from a strong commitment to professional duty rather than genuine disloyalty.
As later documents show, the materials used by the security agencies contributed to a broader atmosphere of fear. They served more as ammunition for a new wave of terror than as a clear indictment of any single doctor. Some critics argue that Timashuk did not intend to provoke the broader sabotage theory, but in the political climate of the time, such a stance could expose a person to severe repercussions.
The leadership of the 1960s appeared reluctant to publicly challenge Timashuk’s culpability, choosing instead to avoid reopening Old Controversies that could reignite debates about Stalin-era repressions.