Relations between the Russian Empire and the United States have long been cordial, tracing back to the era of George Washington. During the American Revolution, Russia offered quiet support to the rebels, and during the Civil War it backed the Union in a symbolic sense. Territorial questions in the Bering Strait and Alaska were settled peacefully, and in 1867 American assets in Russia were sold for 7.2 million dollars. The bond was largely explained by a shared adversary in Great Britain, plus the absence of conflicting vital interests. As the 19th century drew to a close, Tsarist rule appeared more autocratic to Americans, but neither this nor Far Eastern disagreements seriously damaged the overall relationship. In World War I, Americans stood with the Allies and with Russia, but the October Revolution changed everything.
From that point, the relationship grew tangled. On one side, the RSFSR stood as a stark adversary to the United States: Bolshevik leadership rejected faith, dismissed market economies and capitalism, and preached class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and much of the American elite, steeped in Christian tradition, valued market-based economies and championed the idea that people of all classes could compete in free elections. The Bolsheviks’ aim for a world revolution to overturn liberal democracies made recognition of their regime politically impossible in American eyes.
On the other hand, there was sympathy among Americans for the anti-monarchist upheaval. American newspapers condemned the Bolshevik executions of the royal family but often treated the events with a speculative sense of historical inevitability. Parallels were drawn with earlier monarchies that had undergone violent upheavals, a period that some believed would eventually yield stable democracies. In that hopeful frame, Wilson even contemplated inviting the red delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, where the victors would shape the post-World War I order.
Diplomatic ties between the two nations were non-existent at the time. U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes emphasized in the early 1920s that Moscow aimed to erase existing governments worldwide and thus deserved no recognition for such aims. It was a clear warning about the Bolshevik project and its global objectives. (citation: Douglas Little, Anti-Bolshevism and American Foreign Policy, 1919-1939).
How far have capitalists gone for profit?
Despite deep ideological rifts, money became a unifying force between the USSR and the United States. In the late 1920s, Russia’s industrial push opened a lucrative avenue for American businesses. The Soviet Union sought American technology and ready-made equipment. In 1929, Henry Ford agreed to help establish the Gorky Automobile Plant, which produced two cars modeled after Ford’s Model A and the AA truck. The truck soon became a staple of the Red Army, playing a pivotal role in industrialization and generating substantial revenue for Ford.
Pressure from business circles helped push the United States toward recognizing the USSR. The Great Depression underscored the need for new markets. Franklin D. Roosevelt, elected in a period of economic crisis, weighed the costs and benefits with care. A broad public opinion survey among editors showed strong support for recognition, with about two-thirds in favor and a minority opposed. Roosevelt also met with Catholic leaders to address concerns about Bolshevik repression of believers and the destruction of churches.
In November 1933, the Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov traveled to Washington to outline the terms for recognition. The USSR would guarantee religious freedom for Americans in the country, refrain from subversive interference, and respect U.S. internal affairs. The tricky issue of old tsarist debts was postponed indefinitely. (citation: trade-off discussions and policy notes from the era).
On November 16, Litvinov and Roosevelt exchanged notes to establish diplomatic relations. The first Soviet ambassador to the United States, Alexander Troyanovsky, arrived in America, while William Bullitt became the American ambassador to the USSR. Bullitt arrived in Russia with enthusiasm and a belief in democratic cooperation, but left in 1936 as a staunch anti-communist and critic of totalitarianism.
With relations advancing, full-scale economic cooperation seemed within reach, though trade with the USSR did not deliver the spectacular returns anticipated by many American and Soviet business interests. Disappointment existed on both sides, and much of the anticipated flow of equipment and technology actually entered the Soviet Union through the Amtorg trading organization even before formal diplomatic ties were established.
Turnkey factories
Industrial architect Albert Kahn and his firm, Albert Kahn Inc., played a distinctive role in Soviet industrialization. In the United States, Kahn earned fame for his groundbreaking reinforced concrete industrial structures, which made sprawling production facilities feasible. He also designed notable city buildings and became known as Detroit’s architect, with works such as the Fisher Building and Cadillac Place highlighting his legacy.
Yet his influence on Soviet industry extended far beyond architecture. In 1930, the Soviet Supreme Council of the National Economy and the Kahn company formed Gosproektstroy, a Moscow-based advisory agency with hands-on involvement in design. Led by George Scrimgeour, a Kahn associate, the collaboration trained thousands of Soviet engineers and contributed to the design of more than 500 industrial enterprises.
American firms contributed not only to design but also to construction of turnkey factories. Major projects included plants for AZLK, the GAZ car plant, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, and the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, with some facilities built in the United States and shipped to the USSR. DneproGES and other major energy projects relied heavily on American equipment, including 70 percent of the equipment from General Electric. American involvement extended to oil and radio technology, with Standard Oil of New York assisting the Baku oil region and the Radio Corporation of America helping to develop radio equipment.
In the late 1930s, as Soviet engineers gained expertise, many American specialists were repatriated. Gosproektstroy was dissolved, and Soviet propaganda sought to downplay foreign involvement in industrialization, including dismissing articles that highlighted collaboration. Official Soviet narratives claimed industrial development occurred without foreign capital, though many observers noted that acquiring advanced factories at reasonable prices was a prudent investment and a pragmatic path to rapid modernization.